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Justice-as-Fairness as Judicial
Guiding Principle
REMEMBERING JOHN RAWLS AND THE
WARREN COURT
Michael Anthony Lawrence†
“I am glad to be going to the Supreme Court because
now I can help the less fortunate, the people in our society who
suffer, the disadvantaged.”1
INTRODUCTION
Seventeen individuals have served as Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court since the Constitution’s ratification in 1789.
The decade-and-a-half period when Earl Warren served as the
fourteenth Chief Justice (1953-1969) was marked by numerous
landmark rulings in the areas of racial justice, criminal
procedure, reproductive autonomy, First Amendment freedom of
speech, association, and religion, voting rights, and more. These
decisions led to positive, fundamental changes in the lives of
millions of less advantaged Americans who had been historically
disfavored because of their race, nationality, gender,
socioeconomic class, or political views. The legacy of the Warren
Court is one of an institution committed to “a dedication in the
law to the timeless ideals of ‘human dignity, individual rights,
and fair play, and [a] recognition that the best of us have no more
rights or freedoms than the worst of us.’”2 For its efforts, the

† Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Author, Radicals in
Their Own Time: Four Hundred Years of Struggle for Liberty and Equal Justice in
America (2011); Co-Author, Model Problems and Outstanding Answers: Constitutional
Law (2013). The author thanks the Michigan State University College of Law Research
Librarians, especially Jane Meland and Barbara Bean, for their research assistance.
1 ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 255 (1997).
2 Harry N. Scheiber, The Warren Court, American Law, and Modern Legal
Cultures, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND
FOREIGN LAW 1, 26 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007) [hereinafter EARL WARREN AND THE
WARREN COURT].

673

674

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

Warren Court is considered by some to be the greatest high court
in the nation’s history.3
At the same time, many Warren Court decisions were
hugely controversial, upsetting the settled expectations of those
who benefited from long-entrenched governmental biases and
practices. The ubiquitous “Impeach Earl Warren” billboards seen
throughout the countryside during the late 1950s and the 1960s
reflected the underlying efforts of laissez-faire conservatives to
overturn aspects of the New Deal, which began a quarter century
earlier.4 The intensity of the political opposition to the Court’s
newfound commitment to fairness and equality was matched only
by the infamous pre-Civil War Dred Scott case a full century
earlier.5 To this day and through the decades, conservative jurists,
academics, and others have bemoaned the Warren Court’s
“lawlessness” and lack of principle.6
Ultimately, such criticisms proved wanting. By
demonstrating a consistent concern for the plight of less
advantaged, less favored members of American society, the
Warren Court was, to the contrary, highly principled in exercising
its full powers to achieve fairness and equal protection for all,
regardless of a person’s status in society. We should demand
nothing less from government, which exists, after all, to serve the
people—all the people.
The Warren Court’s practice of using its power of equity to
achieve fair outcomes closely resembles, at its core, the “justiceas-fairness” approach promoted in John Rawls’s monumental
1971 work, A Theory of Justice.7 At its simplest, Rawls suggested
that in order to achieve a just (or “fair”) society, decision-makers
should operate from the original position of equality behind a socalled veil of ignorance, where they have no idea of their own
personal circumstances, in order to promote a just society. If the
individual decision-maker herself knows she might be among the
persons most negatively affected by a proposed or possible
decision, she is much more likely—operating in her own selfinterest—to “hedge her bets” and make a decision that is fair to
all. By applying this approach, the interests of less advantaged,
more vulnerable members of society are adequately considered,
See infra Section II.A.2.
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 19.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 847-48 (2007) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 120 (1975)); Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV.
L. REV. 143, 145 (1964).
7 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
3

4
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promoting the justice-as-fairness principle of equal opportunity
for all, including the least privileged.
Of course, Earl Warren and the Warren Court did not
adopt justice-as-fairness reasoning per se, since Rawls had not
yet published A Theory of Justice by the time Warren left the
Court in 1969. Nonetheless, principles of fairness and equal
opportunity underlie both the Warren Court’s jurisprudence
and Rawls’s theory of justice.8 Not incidentally, the same core
principles guide notions of public virtue,9 a concept vital to the
founding generation, and the Golden Rule’s ancient mandate,
long recognized by all of the world’s major religious and moral
authorities as to “do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.”10 This article proposes that judicial adherence to the
core principles expressed in these various sources would result
in a markedly more just society—which should be the ultimate
goal for any legitimate system of justice.
This article is divided into three parts. Part I explains
John Rawls’s justice-as-fairness theory and how it has resonated
in legal and constitutional theory. Part II discusses the Warren
Court’s equity-based jurisprudence and its profound impact on
creating a more just America. This part also discusses the
constitutional bases for the Warren Court’s decisions, principally
with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses. Part III then discusses the Warren
Court’s legacy and how its jurisprudence embraced broader
concepts of human rights and public virtue. The article
concludes by suggesting that the essentially Rawlsian justice-asfairness approach could serve as a useful normative ideal for
judicial decisionmaking.
I.

JOHN RAWLS’S A THEORY OF JUSTICE

The year 1971 marked the publication of A Theory of
Justice11 by political philosopher John Rawls.12 A Theory of Justice
“is a modern classic . . . . [I]ts impact on contemporary legal
8 Perhaps the timing of Rawls’s book, written as it was at essentially the
same time as Earl Warren wrapped up his Chief Justiceship, indicates that Rawls was
influenced by the Warren Court’s jurisprudence.
9 See infra Section III.B.2.
10 The Golden Rule dates to antiquity. Homer identified the idea: “Welcome
the coming, speed the parting guest!” See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 31 (Robert Fagles
trans., Penguin Books 1997).
11 RAWLS, supra note 7.
12 Rawls is considered for his work on A Theory of Justice and subsequent
publications to be “the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century”
by many. Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of Stability: John Rawls, Fetal Homicide, and
Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2007).
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thinking has been profound,” writes one legal scholar.13 Widely
cited in law review articles and court opinions, the book has
provided a unifying approach for many theorists and jurists
seeking to elevate basic fairness as an integral component of any
concept of justice.14
Political philosophers are similarly laudatory. “[P]olitical
philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or
explain why not,”15 says one. Another adds, “‘[f]or us in late
twentieth century America,’ . . . [Rawls’s approach] ‘is our vision,
the theory most thoroughly embodied in the practices and
institutions most central to our public life.’”16 More broadly,
Rawls’s work has permeated American society at large, much of
which is sympathetic to the basic thesis that “justice is fairness.”17
Rawls himself explained that his purpose in writing A
Theory of Justice was to offer an alternative framework for the
concept of “justice” that was superior to the utilitarian
approaches that had dominated for the past several centuries
and had operated largely to the detriment of more egalitarian
systems of justice.18 Specifically, “the animating philosophical
idea in A Theory of Justice is that utilitarianism does not take
rights seriously, and that not taking rights seriously is a grave
defect, so we need a theory of justice that better fits our core
convictions about ways people must not be treated.”19
13 Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
549, 550 (1994).
14 Id.; see also Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law,
51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1999) (“[Rawls’s] theory has been widely discussed, criticized,
and applied in diverse scholarly legal and philosophical circles.” (citations omitted));
Stephen M. Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls’s Theory of Justice: Developing a Public
Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 715, 776 (1987) (stating that
“[s]urely one of the reasons for the enthusiastic reception of Rawls’s theory among legal
scholars is that it was perceived as a theory that justified many aspects of the
American constitutional tradition”).
15 Milligan, supra note 12, at 1180 (quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974)).
16 Jesse Furman, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and
the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200 (1997) (quoting Michael J.
Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 82
(1984)); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Political Philosophy Versus Political Theory: The Case of
Rawls, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV 691, 691 (1994) (rebutting some political theorists who
criticized Rawls’s theory as irrelevant to the real world of politics).
17 Milligan, supra note 12, at 1180; see also Peter F. Lake, Liberalism Within
the Limits of the Reasonable Alone: Developments of John Rawls’ Political Philosophy,
Its Political Positivism, and the Limits on Its Applicability, 19 VT. L. REV. 603, 603-05
(1995) (stating that Rawls “set in motion a powerful and inspirational force . . . A
Theory of Justice . . . [provides an] alternative to various forms of utilitarianism,
including . . . law and economics”).
18 RAWLS, supra note 7, at xviii.
19 Richard J. Arneson, Rawls Versus Utilitarianism in the Light of Political
Liberalism, in THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS (Victoria Davion
& Clark Wolf eds., 2000). But see Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified
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To that end, Rawls sought to further develop social
contract theory as originally conceived by the Enlightenment
theorists John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel
Kant.20 To Rawls, the social contract requires that certain
principles of justice, premised on basic fairness, be applied to
society’s institutions to determine whether those institutions are
just. Society’s institutions establish the basic rules regulating
civil and criminal procedure, property, the market economy, and
the family.21
A.

Justice-as-Fairness

Rawls’s A Theory of Justice identifies social justice as
that which exists in an ideal society where individual citizens
engage with each other on the egalitarian bases of mutual
respect and cooperative reciprocity.22 Rawls explains that
“justice as fairness [is] a theory of justice that generalizes and
carries to a higher level of abstraction . . . the [concept of] social
contract.”23 At its root, the theory posits an initial position of
equality which is “designed to lead to an original agreement on
principles of justice.”24
This justice-as-fairness formulation is composed of two core
principles: first, “equal basic liberty,”25 and second, the principle
combining “fair equality of opportunity” and the “difference
principle.”26 These are principles that reasonable, free people,
Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 251
(1998) (suggesting that justice as fairness and utilitarianism are in fact reconcilable
because “justice as [fairness] and justice as efficiency [utilitarianism] both theoretically
result from a consensus. Although each model has its own conditions for bargaining,
these rules can be selectively combined into a single model” (footnote omitted)).
20 RAWLS, supra note 7, at xviii; see also Samuel Freeman, Introduction: John
Rawls—An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 6-9 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 2003) (relating Rawls’s theory to Lockean and Kantian thought); S.A. Lloyd,
Relativizing Rawls, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 709, 735 (1994) (arguing that Rawls’s body of
work withstands criticisms of failing to consider accepted philosophical methods of
argument); Griffin, supra note 14, at 727-28 (explaining Rawls’s suggestion that
determining what is fair in everyday life requires “considering the justice of the basic
structure [of society and the social contract] itself” (quoting John Rawls, Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 551 (1980))).
21 Freeman, supra note 20, at 3.
22 Responding to critics of Rawls who claim the theory attempts to “level” all
people, it is the notion of cooperative reciprocity and mutual respect, “not the ideal of
redressing undeserved inequalities of welfare, resources, or luck, that is at the
foundation of Rawls’s view.” Freeman, supra note 20, at 9; see also Nancy Perkins
Spyke, The Instrumental Value of Beauty in the Pursuit of Justice, 40 U.S.F. L. REV.
451, 461 (2006) (stating that while “Rawls modified his theory, . . . he never wavered
from the ideals of reciprocity and mutual respect”).
23 RAWLS, supra note 8, at 3.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 53; see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
26 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53; see infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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looking out for their own interests “would accept in an initial
position of equality” with others.27 Taken together, Rawls explains,
the principles advance “values of equal protection and civil liberty;
fair equality and opportunity; social equality and reciprocity.”28
Under the first principle of equal basic liberty, “each
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme
of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties
for others.”29 In this context, basic liberties include, in addition
to political liberty, “freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person,
which includes freedom from psychological oppression and
physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person);
the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary
arrest and seizure.”30
Notably, in its attempts to draw constitutional parameters
for democratic government, Rawls’s first principle resembles J.S.
Mill’s principle of liberty.31 Like Mill’s “harm principle”—which
states that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others”32—Rawls’s conception of an
expansive set of basic liberties captures the sentiment famously
expressed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1928,
“The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”33

RAWLS, supra note 7, at 10 (emphasis added).
Milligan, supra note 12, at 1202 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 189-90 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001)).
29 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53.
30 Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 20, at 4 (“Freedom and integrity of the
person” includes “freedom of movement, occupation, and choice of careers, and a right
to personal property.”); Milligan, supra note 12, at 1201-02 (stating that Rawls’s basic
liberties are “the principles that all parties at the original position can agree are
necessary for political justice; they tend to include, among others, freedom of religion
and the protection of one’s physical integrity” (footnote omitted)).
31 Freeman, supra note 20, at 4. Basic liberties do not include such matters
as the “freedom to enter contracts of all kinds, to own weapons, or to accumulate, use,
and dispose of productive resources as one pleases.” Id.
32 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1989) (1859) (“[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the
dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, . . . that the sole
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. . . . The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign.”).
33 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27

28
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The second principle states that “social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage [fair equality of
opportunity], and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all
[difference principle].”34 In other words, social primary goods
(such as wealth, income, opportunity, and liberty) may be
distributed unequally only if such distribution advantages the
least favored.35 The difference principle has been especially
controversial, largely because of this last part—that inequalities
are tolerated only insofar as they advantage the least favored.
Some have characterized the difference principle’s staunchlyegalitarian approach as overly radical.36 Others respond that the
second principle in fact seeks to provide equal opportunities for
all, which would not actually result in radical redistributions.37
Under Rawls’s hypothetical “original position of
equality,” people should imagine themselves in an unknowing
state when making decisions affecting other people—that is,
they should imagine themselves as operating from behind a “veil
of ignorance.”38 No one knows one’s own social status, wealth,
intelligence, fortune, natural skill, and the like.39 Indeed, the
decision-maker may be among the least advantaged and least
fortunate. Because “no one is able to design principles to favor
his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of
a fair agreement or bargain.”40 In such a scenario, decisionmakers who do not know how they themselves are situated with
respect to a given matter will be more likely to make decisions
that are fair to all, including the least privileged.41
34 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53, 87; see also Wenar, Leif, John Rawls (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2013 Edition), STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 24,
2012), plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/rawls [http://perma.cc/4VNK-37KM]
(paraphrasing Rawls’s two principles).
35 See Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The
Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 182 (2001). Rawls
supplements the theory with two priority rules: “Priority of Liberty” (wherein the first
principle of equal political liberty takes priority over the second principle of
socioeconomic equality) and “Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare.” Id. at
180-81; Freeman, supra note 20, at 5.
36 Griffin, supra note 14, at 739.
37 Id. at 739, 740, 742 (stating that “[t]he second principle of justice . . . reduce[s]
inequalities resulting from social circumstances and natural endowment . . . not by
restricting the natural endowment of the more favored, but by improving the circumstances
of those less favored by employing the talents of all in a system of mutual benefit”).
38 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 11.
39 Id. They are allowed to know, however, that they are “heads of families
and as such are interested in their families’ share of primary social goods.” April L.
Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male Sex-Right, 75 OR.
L. REV. 1037, 1057 (1996).
40 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 11.
41 Reasonable minds will differ regarding what is adequate consideration for the
least privileged. Some would require more, others less. This article suggests that the
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Rawls and the Constitution

Since its unveiling in 1971, Rawls’s justice-as-fairness
theory has received copious attention across disciplines, including
law.42 Since any legal discussion inevitably traces back to the
Constitution, it is appropriate to consider justice-as-fairness in
constitutional terms.43
Rawls stated, “The historical experience of democratic
institutions and reflection on the principles of constitutional
design suggest that a practicable scheme of liberties can indeed be
found.”44 Principles of constitutional design protect certain
liberties (primarily through the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth
Amendment in the United States); however, longstanding
constitutional practice has developed a “practicable scheme”
whereby those liberties are, while protected, not absolute. Rawls
accepts that some limits on basic constitutional rights are
acceptable to the extent that those limits fit within a larger
coherent rights framework. For example, “[r]ules of order and
‘time, place, and manner’ regulations are all appropriate. Rights
consideration should provide, at a minimum, subsistence support allowing the least
privileged to enjoy a life of basic human dignity. In later years, Rawls published several
additional works, including Political Liberalism (1996) and Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement (2001), which largely responded to criticisms of various aspects of A Theory of
Justice. Some of the more recent legal commentary assessing Rawls’s subsequent work
describes a theory that is arguably considerably less robust than that originally envisioned
in A Theory of Justice. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and
Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 398 (2003) (suggesting that
under Rawls’s revised theory, such matters as providing basic governmental structure or
securing core liberties may be resolved through a process of judicial review within
constitutional law, but that other matters, such as the operation of difference principles,
would instead be resolved through the political process). But see, e.g., George Klosko,
Rawls’s Argument from Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1882-83 (1994) (stating that
even after Rawls’s subsequent works, “certain fundamental ideas [are still] seen as implicit
in the public political culture of a democratic society”).
42 See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Elizabeth A.
Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian
Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 235 (2003)
(stating, “Rawls is often cited in legal literature, and legal scholars have applied his
methodology to a wide range of issues including welfare rights, tax policy, campaign
finance, and employment discrimination law” (footnote omitted)).
43 Rawls suggested:
The constitution is not what the Court says it is. Rather, it is what the people
acting constitutionally through the other branches eventually allow the Court
to say it is. A particular understanding of the constitution may be mandated
to the Court by amendments, or by a wide and continuing political majority,
as it was in the case of the New Deal.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 237-38 (1993); see also Bruce A. Antkowiak,
Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 605 (2007) (quoting and discussing
Rawls’s commentary on the Constitution).
44 John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values at the University of Michigan (Apr. 10, 1981), http://tannerlectures.utah.
edu/_documents/a-to-z/r/rawls82.pdf [http://perma.cc/N5L7-SKM3].
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may also be restricted, which is to say they may be limited for the
purpose of securing an even more extensive system of rights.”45
1.

Rawls Applied

Scholars have applied Rawls’s justice-as-fairness approach
to a variety of legal topics. Criminal law and procedure, for
example, lend themselves well to Rawlsian analysis. This area of
law—the process for trying defendants and punishing convicted
offenders—involves the most serious and intrusive exercises of
governmental power vis-à-vis the individual citizen. If the
criminal justice system’s legitimacy is to be accepted, citizens
must believe the system is in fact fair and just. This raises a
conundrum, however, “[f]or wouldn’t any citizens, finding
themselves convicted of crimes and facing punishment, simply
withhold their agreement as to the just and fair nature of the
contemplated penalty, whatever its character?”46
Rawlsian analysis helps resolve this difficulty by allowing
us to evaluate a penalty as measured against Rawls’s two
principles of justice in order to understand its underlying values.
“The role of a political conception of justice . . . is not to say exactly
how these questions are to be settled, but to set out a framework
of thought within which they can be approached.”47 In other
words, while Rawlsian analysis may not answer the question of
what the law should say, it at least offers an approach for
assessing what the law actually does say.
This Rawlsian analysis has been applied in a number of
other legal contexts as well. For example, Rawlsian principles are
helpful in discussing matters of intergenerational justice.
Traditional social contract theory encounters difficulty when
applied to justice between generations, since it is problematic to
suggest that the yet unborn are able to “consent” in any meaningful
way to the terms of any particular agreement or arrangement. By
contrast, the very abstractness of Rawls’s original position
analysis allows it to circumvent the sorts of knotty issues raised in
this context by traditional social contract theory.48
45 Griffin, supra note 14, at 764. According to Griffin, “Rawls envisions two
sorts of cases: restrictions on the rights of political participation to protect other
rights . . . , and restrictions of an emergency nature necessary to protect the entire
system of rights in time of war or other constitutional crisis. Both cases are familiar
enough in our constitutional law.” Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 20, at 5 (“[B]asic
liberties can be limited only for the sake of maintaining other basic liberties.”).
46 Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 307, 314 (2004).
47 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 12 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
48 Solum, supra note 35, at 207-08; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Does
Intergenerational Justice Require Rising Standards of Living?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358,
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Intergenerational justice also implicates matters of the
environment and sustainability. One may usefully extend the veil
of ignorance hypothetical to the issue of intergenerational
resource conservation.
[W]here members of society are ignorant about which generation
they would be born into, they would in the original position, agree
upon rules that ensure a condition of “permanent livability;” one that
assures that sufficient resources are available for the sustenance of
each succeeding generation.49

It only stands to reason that when people begin to think
more carefully about how they might personally be affected in
the future by present-day harmful environmental practices, they
will be more likely to support efforts to ameliorate the damage
today. For instance, regarding foreign policy, including selfdefense and the state, from behind the veil of ignorance, we can
consider whether preemptive strikes may be justified in the face
of potentially imminent attacks.50
Another area where Rawlsian analysis proves helpful is in
assessing the law’s fairness, over time, to women.51 Even a
cursory inquiry exposes the failure of the U.S. constitutional
regime to provide for gender equality over the past two
centuries.52 While gender equality has markedly improved over
1363 (2009) (stating that according to Rawls’s just savings principle, “[e]ach generation
must . . . put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation”
(quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 285 (1971))); see, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato,
Justice Between Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 222 (2002) (“Regulated by a principle of
intergenerational savings [in copyright law], individual[ ] [authors] within each generation
are obliged to forgo immediate gains that are available to them where necessary to protect
the interests of future generations.”).
49 Alhaji B.M. Marong, From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of
International Legal Norms in Sustainable Development, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
21, 42 (2003).
50 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
449, 466 (2008) (asking, rhetorically, “Behind the veil of ignorance, would not we all
agree to limited, humane preemptive strikes for the safety of all?” (quoting Stephen J.
Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 296 (1999))).
51 A Theory of Justice has been criticized for its insensitivity to gender concerns.
“[I]n 1971, [Rawls] did not explicitly list gender as one of the unknowns behind the veil of
ignorance.” Catherine Powell, Lifting our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism,
and Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331, 338
(2005); see also Marion Smiley, Democratic Citizenship v. Patriarchy: A Feminist
Perspective on Rawls, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1601-02 (2004) (identifying feminist
concerns as “first, that that the methodology underlying Rawls’s Original Position—
individuation and abstraction—privileges men over women by undermining the values of
care and relationship; second, that individuals behind the Veil of Ignorance cannot
produce principles of justice that are powerful enough to challenge the patriarchal family;
and third, that Rawls’s insistence on a Veil of Ignorance takes away from black women
and other women of color in particular the racial and cultural identities necessary to both
their moral agency and their personal integrity” (footnotes omitted)).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that “[t]hrough a century plus three decades and
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the past 40 years, work still remains to be done. This work is
aided by approaching gender questions from behind a Rawlsian
veil of ignorance, where male and female decision-makers are
unaware of their gender, and therefore protect, in their own selfinterest, the interests of the less privileged (female) class—in case
they themselves happen to be among the disadvantaged class.53
2. Judicial Review
How does the doctrine of judicial review fare under
Rawlsian analysis? Since the early days of the Republic, as
enunciated first by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,54 judicial review—the judiciary’s review of the actions of
the equal, elected legislative and executive branches—has become
an indispensable feature of American constitutionalism.55 Even
so, in principle, judicial review is controversial. It arguably
offends basic democratic principles for an unelected group of
judges to be able to override the actions of duly elected legislative
more of [our nation’s] history, women did not count among voters composing ‘We the
People’; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the franchise. And for a
half century thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government, both federal
and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as any ‘basis in
reason’ could be conceived for the discrimination.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
53 Powell, supra note 51, at 338 (stating that “the principles selected behind a
veil of ignorance would be more consistent with CEDAW [Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women] than the sex equality
paradigm that has developed through judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution”).
While Rawls himself was agnostic on the topic of abortion, “he nonetheless left behind
a coherent theoretical model with which to analyze the justness of policy
determinations.” Milligan, supra note 12, at 1181. Regarding other possible topical
areas, “[S]ome . . . have argued that disability fares well under a Rawlsian analysis
because, similar to the decision makers in the original position, no one knows if or
when he or she might become disabled . . . .” Pendo, supra note 42, at 244; see also
Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 154-55 (2012) (explaining Rawlsian analysis in the context of
international investment treaty practices, commenting that negotiating states “are
moving closer to the ‘original position’”).
54 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
55 The doctrine of judicial review is regarded by some as nothing short of
America’s greatest contribution to constitutional theory. As Professor Bickel puts it,
Marbury v. Madison . . . exerts an enormous magnetic pull. It is, after all, a
great historic event, a famous victory; and it constitutes, even more than
victories won by arms, one of the foundation stones of the Republic. It is
hallowed. It is revered. If it had a physical presence, like the Alamo or
Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the truth is that it very
nearly does have and very nearly is.
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 74 (1962); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional
Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5

(2003) (stating, “Marbury not only represents the fountainhead of judicial review, but
also furnishes the canonical statement of the necessary and appropriate role of courts
in the constitutional scheme”).
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and executive officials. Many have expressed this concern,
including Judge Learned Hand, who vocally favored democratic
institutions and principles over the “countermajoritarianism”
inherent in America’s practice of broad judicial review.
[I]t would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they
were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I
have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.56

On the other hand, there are ample reasons why the
Constitution subjects majoritarian democracy to judicial review.
Courts are able to give more protection to disfavored individuals
or minorities who, by definition, are not well represented in a
majoritarian political process. Moreover, judicial review is able to
protect core principles and lasting values that might tend to get
lost or minimized in the heat-of-the-moment intensity of political
conflict.57 Judicial review offers, in short, an important check on
majorities that would, whether because of their own inherent
biases, reactionary political responses, or any other reason,
oppress minorities.
Indeed, the Founders themselves were well aware of the
perils of leaving the people’s liberties to the whims of direct and
elected majorities. James Madison, arguing in support of the
passage of the Bill of Rights before the First Congress, said,
“independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
[l]egislative or [e]xecutive [branches].”58 In a letter to a French
correspondent, Thomas Jefferson averred, “[t]he laws of the land,
administered by upright Judges, would protect you from any
exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United
States.”59 And Alexander Hamilton commented, in Federalist 78,
as paraphrased by Rebecca Brown, that “the judiciary was
entrusted with the primary responsibility for guarding the value
56 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958); see also BICKEL, supra note
55, at 18 (“[N]othing . . . can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant
institution in the American democracy.”).
57 Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes,
21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 572-73 (1996) (stating that “courts will be a great deal
firmer and wiser than legislatures in interpreting constitutional guarantees which
protect essential liberty”); see also Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of
Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1952) (“The task of democracy is not to
have the people vote directly on every issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility
for the acts of their representatives, elected or appointed.”).
58 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
59 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 25960 (1924) (quoting Jefferson, VIII, letter to Archibald H. Rowan, Sept. 26, 1798).
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that underlay the entire constitutional structure: The courts were
expected to commit to ‘inflexible and uniform adherence to the
rights of the Constitution, and of individuals . . . .’”60 Such
statements by Madison and Hamilton, primary architects of the
U.S. Constitution and principle authors of the Federalist Papers—
not to mention statements by Jefferson, primary draftsman of the
Declaration of Independence—demonstrate judicial review’s
strong pedigree within the American constitutional tradition.
Under Rawlsian analysis, the doctrine of judicial review
is neither inherently favored nor disfavored. In Rawls’s view, the
legitimacy of any governmental system—whether it involves
pure majority rule, a more complex constitutional system with
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, or some other
arrangement—ultimately depends on whether the system
provides adequate protections for the principles of equal basic
liberty and fair equality of opportunity described in the justiceas-fairness formulation.61
One thing that is possible to say about a Rawlsian
perspective of judicial review is that it views the judiciary as
better suited than the legislature to effectuate a fair outcome
approximating that which would be achieved if decided from
behind a veil of ignorance. Whereas legislative efforts would
likely involve complicated formulations and exceptions that
would test even the most able legislature, constitutional equal
protection and due process analysis lends itself more easily to an
inquiry into basic fairness. Judges are sworn to act impartially
and fairly in the administration of justice—the very same sorts
of behaviors required of those who would act from behind a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance.62
In sum, Rawls’s theory provides strong support for the
legitimacy of judicial review within the U.S. constitutional
system. Whatever means best accomplish the end of protecting
equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity—including judicial
review—they are justified.63

60 Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 571 (1998) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 441 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)).
61 Griffin, supra note 14, at 774.
62 Id. (“Of course, the courts cannot play the same role as the legislature in
guaranteeing the system of rights. The courts cannot enact legislation or act on their
own to create cases. Further, Rawls makes it clear that no branch of government has a
monopoly on constitutional interpretation.”).
63 Id. at 775.
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THE WARREN COURT

Several hundred feet from the Tomb of the Unknowns at
the Arlington National Cemetery, about a half-mile from John F.
Kennedy’s eternal flame, rests the grave of Earl Warren. The
tombstone reads:
Where there is injustice, we should correct it; where there is poverty, we
should eliminate it; where there is corruption, we should stamp it out;
where there is violence we should punish it; where there is neglect, we
should provide care; where there is war, we should restore peace; and
wherever corrections are achieved we should add them permanently to
our storehouse of treasures.64

This statement of Warren’s personal philosophy, made in
1972 toward the end of his life, provides insight into how Warren
approached his work as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from
1953 to 1969. The Warren Court holds a special place in
American history for its bold interpretations of the Constitution’s
mandates for fairness and equality for all. Indeed, the sheer scope
of the Warren Court’s influence approaches that of the
foundational early-nineteenth-century Marshall Court.65
Over the course of 16 years, the Warren Court ended de
jure racial segregation, broadened protections for criminal
defendants, enhanced voting rights, bolstered freedom of the press
and freedom of speech, halted the witch hunts for communists, and
more.66 Unphased by the firestorms of controversy its decisions
created throughout the nation, the Court was resolute in its
movement toward greater fairness and equal justice. In adopting
broad readings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses, the Court embraced a new conception of
individual rights based on core principles of human dignity.67
The Warren Court also substantially considered individual
rights as protected by the First Amendment’s grant of freedom of
speech, including in the context of protests involving civil rights
groups, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and church-state
relations.68 Regarding speech, the Justices bolstered protection of
64 JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE
516-17 (2006); see also Arlington National Cemetery Map, ARLINGTON CEMETERY,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Arlington_National_Cemetery_
map_-_2013.jpg [http://perma.cc/2HZB-CMD8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (showing the
relationship of Warren’s grave to the cemetery’s other landmarks, including President
Kennedy’s flame and the Tomb of the Unknowns).
65 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 1.
66 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 11.
67 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 20.
68 Id.; see also infra notes 224-248 and accompanying text (discussing the
Warren Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
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expressive conduct and symbolic speech. On the First
Amendment’s religion clauses, the Court embraced a more robust
conception of the wall of separation between church and state
than had ever been observed by earlier Courts.69 The principles
embraced by the Warren Court in these and other cases
uncannily foreshadowed those later enunciated by John Rawls’s
formulation in 1971.
A.

Chief Justice Earl Warren

Because the Warren Court’s jurisprudence is so closely
identified with its namesake, it is useful to discuss Earl Warren,
the man. Warren joined the Court at age 62, appointed as Chief
Justice by President Eisenhower upon the death of Chief Justice
Fred Vinson in 1953. Warren was from California, where he had
served for 10 years as governor, 4 years before that as California
attorney general, and 14 years before that as Alameda County
district attorney.70
When Warren joined the Court in 1953, America was still
in many ways an immature work in progress. The decades-old
paranoia of communism had reached full bloom with the advent
of the Cold War and McCarthyism, when thousands of Americans
had their careers and livelihoods destroyed by congressional
committees bent on rooting out communist sympathizers based on
the scantest of evidence. Reconstruction’s early promise to
integrate American society had devolved into nearly a century of
institutionalized racism that continued to diminish the nation’s
moral authority. Earl Warren, who believed the nineteenthcentury Supreme Court had failed in its duty to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate to protect African-Americans
after the abolition of slavery, knew the twentieth-century
Supreme Court should be doing more.71
The Court that Warren would be leading was highly
polarized. Composed in the mid-1940s of “the most brilliant and
able collection of Justices who ever graced the high bench
together,” according to Yale law professor Fred Rodell, each of
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 20-21.
CRAY, supra note 1, at 47, 97, 132, 254.
71 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 16; see, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) (upholding the doctrine of “separate but equal,” thus opening the door for the
perpetuation of another 60 years of apartheid throughout the South); see also NEWTON,
supra note 64, at 3 (“[I]n 1953 [America] remained an immature country in many
respects. Institutionally sanctioned racism eroded America’s moral authority. The Cold
War and internal debate over Communism ran rivulets of fear and divisiveness
through the body politic. Spotty respect for the human rights promised to its citizens in
the Declaration of Independence but withheld from them by its courts undermined
America’s desire to lead the world by example.”).
69

70
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whom “possessed . . . a peculiarly forceful personality[, and were
as a group] . . . perhaps the most unbrotherly in the Court’s
annals.”72 The most prominent Justices of that Court were, on one
side of the doctrinal divide, Hugo Black and William Douglas, and
on the other, Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson. These
Justices had deeply opposing views on the role of the Court in
constitutional interpretation, and Warren’s appointment to Chief
Justice did little to appease this tension.73 But as Chief Justice, it
was Warren’s responsibility to strike a balance and set the tone
for the Court.74 Warren excelled in this role.
Indeed, by many accounts, Earl Warren was an
extraordinary leader, and his co-Justices stressed his exceptional
ability to conduct conferences. “It is incredible how efficiently the
Chief would conduct the Friday conferences,” recounted Justice
Brennan, “leading the discussion of every case on the agenda,
with a knowledge of each case at his fingertips.”75
Warren was an unapologetic activist in addressing certain
matters that came before the Court. He was, for example,
“convinced that his Court had no choice but to assert and enforce
constitutional mandates for equal protection.”76 Yet Warren also
believed that Congress had an equal responsibility to uphold the
Constitution. He emphasized that a legislative approach achieved
through the democratic process was in theory far superior to
judicial interpretation alone (but only if the legislature exercised
its power to achieve just outcomes).77 For Warren, it was crucial
that the legislative and judicial branches shared the task of
interpreting and upholding the Constitution.
“The Warren Court, did not always have the luxury,
however, of sharing the burden.”78 Congress was often unwilling,
or simply unable, to adequately protect citizens’ constitutional
rights from the intrusions of an overweening bureaucracy.
Professor and former Kennedy administration Solicitor General
Archibald Cox explained, “the Warren Court’s ‘activism’ was
deployed mainly in these areas of law and policy, where, in
[Warren’s] opinion as in the Court’s view, ‘politicians [in Congress
72 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME
COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 32 (1983).
73 Id. “To Frankfurter,” professor and biographer Bernard Schwartz explains,
“the law was almost an object of religious worship—and the Supreme Court its holy of
holies . . . . If Frankfurter saw himself as the priestly keeper of the shrine, he looked on
[Hugo] Black and his supporters, notably [William] Douglas, as false prophets defiling
hallowed ground.” Id. at 40.
74 Id. at 73.
75 Id. at 144.
76 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 15.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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or the states] were blind to fundamental injustice.’”79 Throughout
the Warren Court years, social activists came to understand that
their best ally in advancing their policy goals was the Court, not
state legislatures or Congress.80
Warren believed that each case before the Court should be
“evaluated in terms of practical application” and that the Court
must consider “the human equation, for what we do with our legal
system will determine what American life will be—not only now
but in the years ahead . . . . [L]aw must not be placed in a
straitjacket of historical precedent.”81 As one of Warren’s law
clerks, Curtis Reitz, explained, “He wasn’t tied down by doctrine.
He wasn’t into the piddling kinds of distinctions that so box the
lawyer . . . . His understanding of human beings, and his
understanding of social conditions, and the way society and
government worked, was absolutely extraordinary.”82 Law, as
Warren explained in a Fortune magazine article, “is simply a
mature and sophisticated attempt, never perfected, to
institutionalize this sense of justice and to free men from the
terror and unpredictability of arbitrary force.”83
Warren admitted that he was not a legal scholar in the
classic sense; he was, instead, a pragmatist. “I wish that I could
speak to you in the words of a scholar . . . , but it has not fallen
to my lot to be a scholar in life,” he stated in a 1957 speech, “I
have been in public life for forty years. Since that time, I have
been doing the urgent rather than the important.”84 Warren’s
lack of any judicial experience prior to coming to the Supreme
Court allowed his common-sense interest in fairness and equal
justice to flourish.85
But Warren did not disregard the established law. He
knew there had to be solid authority for ruling a certain way. He
also knew, however, that one could find a legitimate legal
argument for virtually any position.86 Warren looked first to the
facts of a given case. He decided cases on moral grounds: what
Id. (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT 70 (1968)).
Gordon Silverstein, The Warren Court and Congress, in EARL WARREN AND
THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 197.
81 CRAY, supra note 1, at 317 (quoting Warren).
82 Id.
83 Id. (quoting Warren, Fortune magazine).
84 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 287; see also CRAY, supra note 1, at 531
(commenting, “Earl Warren was neither a student of government nor a judicial
craftsman. Neither was he a legal scholar. He lacked an articulated judicial philosophy
beyond the penetrating and constant query, ‘Is it fair?’”).
85 Melissa Cully Anderson & Bruce E. Cain, Venturing Onto the Path of
Equal Representation: The Warren Court and Redistricting, in EARL WARREN AND THE
WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 29, 40.
86 CRAY, supra note 1, at 357.
79

80
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helped the person as well as what would promote a more fair
society. What Warren cared most about ultimately was who won
and who lost.87 Indeed, once, in a 1957 conference, an exasperated
Felix Frankfurter exclaimed to Warren, “God damn it, you’re a
judge! You don’t decide cases by your sense of justice or your
personal predilections.” To which Warren replied with matching
passion, “Thank heaven, I haven’t lost my sense of justice.”88
Over time, Frankfurter’s clever procedural maneuverings
alienated Warren, leading Warren to reject overly formalist
readings of jurisdictional rules.89 Warren complained that the
rules were “only binding because Felix says so.”90 Warren learned
from watching Felix Frankfurter that “a judge could do whatever
he damn pleased . . . . At least it didn’t turn much on whether he
had a legal basis for it. And so [Warren] didn’t give so much of a
damn about the legal grounds.”91
Justice Frankfurter, by contrast, advocated for judicial
restraint, and he typically went to considerable lengths to find
legislative or other official bases for the Court not to hear or
decide a particular dispute. Above all, Frankfurter believed it was
inappropriate for a judge to impose his own views on the
Constitution, on the reasoning that such behavior is more
legislative than judicial in nature.92
Frankfurter vehemently opposed Warren’s activist,
equity-based approach.93 Frankfurter’s frequent correspondence
with the esteemed Judge Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was withering in its criticisms of
Warren and his activist allies on the Court. Frankfurter
complained to his fellow Justices as well. “I do not conceive,” he
fumed in a 1957 note to Justice William Brennan, “that it is my
function to decide cases on my notion of justice and, if it were, I
wouldn’t be as confident as some others that I know exactly
what justice requires in a particular case . . . . I envy those for
whom the dictates of justice are spontaneously revealed.”94 For
Id. at 356.
Id.
89 Id. at 310.
90 Id.
91 Id. (quoting Gunther) (stating also, “[and so t]he Chief struck out on his
own, . . . no longer intimidated by Frankfurter’s erudition and his own inexperience”).
92 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 265.
93 CRAY, supra note 1, at 307.
94 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 267. According to Justice Potter Stewart,
Frankfurter
87

88

was as fickle as a high school girl. I understand . . . that, when Earl Warren
first came to the Court as Chief Justice [in 1953], Felix was going around
Washington saying, ‘This is the greatest Chief Justice since John Marshall
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his part, a bitter Judge Hand wrote to Frankfurter, “It must be
damnable . . . to be one of a bunch that can never agree, and of
whom four at any rate regard themselves as Teachers of the
Four Fold Way and the Eight Fold Path.” Elsewhere, Hand
denigrated “‘those Harbingers of a Better World—Black,
Douglas, Brennan and THE CHIEF’ and called the four ‘the
Jesus Quartet,’ ‘the Jesus Choir,’ and ‘the Holy Ones.’ ‘Oh,’ he
declared in still another letter, ‘to have the inner certainties of
those Great Four of your Colleagues!’”95
Warren believed that the Court had a responsibility to
enforce constitutional guarantees, and anything less amounted to
“judicial abnegation.”96 Too much judicial restraint, Warren
believed, had led to the Court’s failure to address the many
problems facing Americans at that time. This judicial neglect had
created conflict and division in the nation,97 and Warren
understood the Court’s imperative to be to meet the needs of a
dissenting society by facing those problems head on and according
to the principles as interpreted by the judiciary.98 To critics who
accused the Court of “throwing society in a turmoil . . . [by]
look[ing] about for sore spots in the society and proceed[ing] to
operate upon them,” Warren responded: “That is not how we
work . . . . We reflect the burning issues of our society; we do not
manufacture them . . . . [T]he times we are living in determine the
kind of cases we hear.”99 And to friends who complained that the
Court was going too fast, Warren emphasized, “There should be
no delay in correcting a mistake.”100
Indeed, Warren viewed the Supreme Court as
something akin to a modern-day Court of Chancery, charged
with securing equity and fairness in individual cases, especially
those involving poor, less advantaged, or underprivileged
parties.101 During oral arguments, it was not unusual for

and maybe greater.’ And by the time I got here [in 1958, he] had very much
been disenchanted by the Chief Justice.
Id. at 147.

95 Id. at 277-78 (footnotes omitted). Justice Frankfurter’s doctrinal approach
often prevailed in Warren’s first decade on the Court. After Frankfurter’s 1962
retirement, however, “it seems Warren’s natural leadership skills and fundamental
commitment to equality ‘won over’ the rest of the Court.” Anderson & Cain, supra note
85, at 43.
96 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 265.
97 Id.
98 CRAY, supra note 1, at 317.
99 Id. at 462.
100 Id. at 339.
101 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 252, 267.

692

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:2

Warren to sit silently, “only to lean forward at the end of an
argument to ask, ‘Yes, but is it fair?’”102
As an illustration of its equitable approach, the Warren
Court frequently considered the merits when deciding
employment cases that turned on issues of fact. Warren drew
upon his personal experience working for the Southern Pacific
Railroad in his youth (where his father had worked as well) in
making a special point to protect workers who had suffered
devastating accidents.103 He took seriously the Supreme Court’s
role as the final chance for aggrieved widows and orphans to
recover under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),
instructing his clerks to regularly take FELA cases in order to
demonstrate the Court’s commitment to enforcing the statute.104
The same sensibilities were revealed in Voris v. Eikel, a
case involving a workers’ compensation claim.105 In Voris, the
lower court had denied an injured longshoreman’s claim because
he had failed to notify his employer as required by the workers’
compensation statute. In a short opinion authored by Warren, the
Court reversed on the ground that the worker’s notification of his
immediate supervisor was adequate to satisfy the statutory
notification requirements. In the opinion, Warren stated that the
“Act must be liberally construed . . . and in a way which avoids
harsh and incongruous results.”106 Warren’s reasoning, essentially
Rawlsian in its concern for fairness—is typical of Warren’s
equitable approach across the board.
Additional anecdotes epitomize Warren’s passion for
justice and fairness. Warren’s longtime colleague Justice William
CRAY, supra note 1, at 317 (emphasis added).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 270-71.
104 Id. at 271. “Once installed in the Chief ’ s office, [his law clerks] discovered
their training and honed intelligence were less important to Warren than their
humanity,” Cray reported. “That overriding sense of justice led the Chief to instruct his
clerks when they were reviewing petitions for certiorari not to keep off petitioners
‘where personal rights are concerned. With property cases, we may be more severe and
deny cert[iorari].’” CRAY, supra note 1, at 356.
105 Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 (1953).
106 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 134. The Warren Court’s approach in these
cases is in sharp contrast to that of the modern Supreme Court, where the Court more
willingly denies recourse. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 550 U.S. 618
(2007) (barring recovery under claim of gender-based pay discrimination because of
plaintiff ’ s failure to timely contest, within the statutorily required 180 days, each year’s
disparate salary, even though she only became aware of disparities after many years of
unequal salaries). Combined with the related issue of the Court’s overly expansive
interpretation of states’ sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (see, for
example, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding unconstitutional
Congress’s provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 allowing
individual plaintiffs to sue states for age discrimination in employment settings)), these
cases show a Roberts Court that is demonstrably less friendly to more vulnerable and less
powerful members of society.
102
103
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Douglas opined, at the time of Warren’s death in 1974, that “in
many ways the lesser cases mirrored the philosophy of the
man.”107 Schwartz suggested that Warren’s character was perhaps
best exemplified in the 1967 Brooks v. Florida108 case. Brooks
involved the aftermath of a riot by African-American inmates in a
Florida prison, where Brooks and the others were placed naked,
in the Supreme Court’s words, in a “windowless sweatbox . . . a
barren cage fitted only with a hole in one corner into which he
and his cell mates could defecate.”109 Brooks was kept in the cell
with only the sparsest of rations; when he was removed from the
cell after two weeks, he signed a confession within minutes—
evidence that was accepted by the Florida Supreme Court in
affirming his conviction for participating in the riot. Warren was
angered by the Supreme Court’s 8-1 vote to deny certiorari,
reportedly exclaiming, “Doggone it! If those guys don’t want to
take this case, I want to be sure that every gruesome detail is
recorded in those books up there [pointing to the Supreme Court
Reports] for posterity.” After sharing a very pointed dissent,
Warren “‘just kind of sat in his office and waited.’ In the next
month, the Justices came in one by one and joined the dissent. By
the next conference on the case, the Chief had the votes of all, not
only for the granting of cert, but for summary reversal.”110
So while Justice Frankfurter may have viewed the
Court as solely a “seat of law,” Justice Warren viewed it “as a
seat of justice.”111
B.

Equity as a Guiding Principle for the Warren Court

Underlying virtually every aspect of the Warren Court’s
(and Earl Warren’s) jurisprudence was a concern for fairness.112
In judicial conference for one of the reapportionment cases,113
for example, Justice Douglas recalls Warren stating that the
“starting point in this type of case is whether apportionment
meets standards of republican form of government . . . that

SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 155-56 (citing Douglas in ABA Journal).
Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967).
109 Id. at 414.
110 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 719-20 (quoting Tyrone Brown, the law clerk
who worked on the case); see also CRAY, supra note 1, at 446-47 (similarly describing
Warren’s behind-the-scenes efforts in the Brooks case).
111 CRAY, supra note 1, at 310.
112 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. “Warren distinguished
himself from his colleagues on the Court by his reliance on intuition, instinct,” and
what Warren’s 1963 law clerk Frank Beytagh referred to as “overwhelming dedication
to fairness.” Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 44.
113 See infra Section II.C.2.
107

108
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means, is it representative? Is it fairly representative?”114
Warren insisted that equality should be the starting point for
the judiciary in language that John Rawls might have also
used 10 years later in constructing A Theory of Justice: “Equal
representation is basic.”115
The Warren Court’s fairness jurisprudence was animated
by the ancient doctrine of equity. Equity as a concept seems to have
been first enunciated around 340 B.C. by Aristotle, who
commented, “For that which is equitable seems to be just, and
equity is justice that goes beyond the written law.”116 Some two
millennia later, in 1835, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story
explained:
In the most general sense, we are accustomed to call that Equity which
in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and
right, and which properly arises ex aequo et bono . . . . Equity must have
a place in every rational system of jurisprudence, if not in name, at least
in substance. It is impossible, that any code, however minute and
particular, should embrace, or provide for the infinite variety of human
affairs, or should furnish rules applicable to all of them.117

Equity, in short, is a necessary gap filler in any legitimate system
of laws.
Equity has a long tradition in American law, with its
antecedent in English law. In England, the concept began to take
shape as early as the Norman period (the eleventh and twelfth
centuries) with the formation of the Curia Regis, or King’s Court.
“It is to be understood that the King’s Court was a sure asylum
for the oppressed,”118 authoritative histories instruct. Over the
following centuries, the Court of Chancery’s caseload increased,
and it became dramatically influential. In the process, it sparked
long-standing turf wars between itself and Courts of Law—until

Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 44.
Id. at 44, 45; see also Vicki C. Jackson, The Early Hours of the Post-World
War II Model of Constitutional Federalism: The Warren Court and the World, in EARL
WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 137, 157 (commenting that the
Reynolds v. Sims reapportionment decision’s “one-person, one vote principle was
accessible to the popular sense of fairness”). See infra notes 149-171 and accompanying
text for discussion of reapportionment cases.
116 GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1982) (quoting
ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA (Loeb Classical Library ed., G. Cyril Armstrong trans.,
Harvard University Press 1935)); see also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, MCCLINTOCK ON
EQUITY 1-23 (1936) (referencing equity’s historical roots).
117 JOSEPH
STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES § 56-58, at 62-65 (Arno 1972).
118 A.H. MARSH, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY AND OF THE RISE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITY 12 (1890) (quoting 1 MADOX’ HISTORY OF
THE EXCHEQUER 120 (1711)).
114
115
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its dissolution and merger with those Courts of Law in 1875.119 “In
the course of time the Chancellor . . . came to be called the keeper
of the King’s conscience.”120 The Chancery was considered to be
“the secret closett of his Majesty’s conscience where his oppressed
and distressed subjects hope to find mercy and mitigation against
the rigour and extremitye of his lawes.”121 Or, as Lord Chancellor
Ellesmere explained, Chancery “is the refuge of the poor and
afflicted, it is the altar and sanctuary for such as against the might
of rich men and the countenance of great men, [who] cannot
maintain the goodness of their cause and the truth of their title.”122
In the United States (and the colonies before them), after a
slow start, equity began to have a place in the Enlightenment
theory that culminated around the end of the eighteenth century,
explained Justice Joseph Story in his highly influential 1835
work, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (cited by, among
many others, Abraham Lincoln).123 As for its nature, equity
originates from the same sources as in England, and it is applied
in much the same manner. As Story notes: “The Constitution of
the United States has . . . conferred on the National Judiciary
cognizance of cases in Equity, as well as in Law; and the uniform
interpretation of the clause has been, that . . . Equity
Jurisprudence embraces the same matters of jurisdiction and
modes of remedy, as exist in England.”124

119 Id. at 47-48. Among the objections to Chancery were those of subjectivity,
as expressed famously by the seventeenth-century jurist John Selden:

Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have a measure and know what to trust
to. Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor; and as that
is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the
standard for the measure the Chancellor’s foot. What an uncertain measure
would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot; a third an
indifferent foot. It is the same thing with the Chancellor’s conscience.
Id. at 103-04.
120 Id. at 14; see also DENNIS R. KLINCK, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT
OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1-2 (2010).
121 MARSH, supra note 118, at 14-15 (quoting Hargrave’s Law Tracts, 427).
122 Id. at 48. See generally CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., EQUITABLE
REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 2-8 (8th ed. 2011).
123 STORY, supra note 117, at 62-63. In a September 25, 1860, letter to an
aspiring lawyer, Abraham Lincoln wrote:
Dear Sir: . . . The mode [of learning the law] is very simple, though laborious, and
tedious. It is only to get the books, and read, and study them carefully. Begin with
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and after reading it carefully through, say twice,
take up Chitty’s Pleadings, Greenleaf ’ s Evidence, & Story’s Equity &c. in
succession. Work, work, work, is the main thing. Yours very truly A. Lincoln.
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/law.htm [http://perma.cc/EJ8S-XXRN]
(last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
124 KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 64-65.
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Specifically, Courts of Equity are not as constrained as
Courts of Law. While they have certain prescribed procedures,
Courts of Equity may adjust their approaches to fit the needs of
different cases. They may model the remedy and adjust the rights
of all interested parties, whereas common law courts must confine
their reach to the parties in the instant case.125 Moreover, a Court
of Equity’s jurisdiction may extend to those instances “where the
principles of law, by which the ordinary courts are guided, give no
right, but, upon the principles of universal justice, the
interference of the judicial power is necessary to prevent a wrong,
and the positive law is silent.”126
More recently, McClintock on Equity explains, “Equity
jurisdiction may attach [in the United States] in almost any field
of the law, where the circumstances may call for the exercise of its
peculiar powers.”127 A recently published casebook on equitable
remedies adds that equitable doctrines “have continuing vitality
insofar as they inspire judges to consider themselves as being
bound by a higher obligation.”128 Moreover, it states, “Modern
judges . . . exercising ‘equitable jurisdiction,’ like the early
chancellors, feel less constricted in their application of precedents
than do their counterparts who are exercising jurisdiction over
claims for legal relief.”129
The principle that courts in the United States have wide
latitude to offer equitable relief has long been recognized by the
Supreme Court. In an 1869 contract case, for example, the Court
announced that “relief . . . is a matter resting in the discretion of
the court [of equity], to be exercised upon a consideration of all the
circumstances of each particular case.”130 Nearly 100 years later,
the Warren Court embraced equitable principles in the landmark
case of Brown v. Board of Education when it announced that “[i]n
fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided
by equitable principles . . . . These cases call for the exercise of
these traditional attributes of equity power,” and “[c]ourts of
equity may properly take into account the public interest in the
Id. § 28, at 27-28.
Id. § 32, at 30-31 (quoting Lord Redesdale); see also MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 116, at 29, 52-53 (citing 1 POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND
EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 363 (4th ed. 1918)) (describing certain “maxims of
equity . . . that guide courts of equity in the exercise of their discretion”).
127 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 116, at 60. See generally KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET
AL., supra note 122, at 8-11. General courts of law could hear both law and equity cases
beginning around the 1850s. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law
and equity. Many courts of law thereafter embraced the more flexible equity court
procedures. Id.
128 KOVACIC-FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 122, at 11.
129 Id. at 12.
130 Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Cranch) 557, 565 (1869).
125

126
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elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective
manner.”131
In sum, the fairness jurisprudence of the sort practiced
by the Warren Court and as promoted by John Rawls’s original
position theory has a long history in the Anglo-American legal
tradition. The next section examines the specific constitutional
bases for the Court’s equity-based approach.
C.

Constitutional Bases: Equal Protection

The Warren Court accomplished much of its work by
breathing life into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses—provisions the Court read as
essentially providing for fair, equitable outcomes. Earl Warren’s
position regarding equal protection and due process “rested on his
profound belief that America’s highest court must interpret the
Constitution in light of ‘the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”132 Warren believed that
the Constitution’s provisions for the Court’s role were not “‘hollow
shibboleths’ but rather must be continuously evaluated and
advanced as ‘living principles.’”133
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Warren
Court’s jurisprudence revolutionized what it meant to enjoy
“equal protection of the laws” in America. During the nearly
hundred years following the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification
in 1868, the Court refused to consider that the clause—once
derided by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as “the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments”134—might embrace anything
beyond official racial discrimination. And even then, the Court
interpreted the clause very narrowly, holding in Plessy v.
Ferguson in 1896 that laws requiring separation of the races did
not technically violate the letter of the Equal Protection Clause,
so long as alternate facilities were “equal.”135 Beginning with its
first landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education, however,
the Warren Court transformed the clause into what is now a
robust provision protecting not only against racial discrimination

131 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) [hereinafter
Brown II] (emphasis added); see also infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text
(discussing Brown v. Board of Education).
132 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 20.
133 Id.
134 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539 (1942) (citing
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
208 (1927)).
135 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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but also against a broad range of other forms of injustice,
including discriminatory practices involving voting rights.136
1. School Desegregation Cases
The first major case of Earl Warren’s tenure as Chief
Justice, Brown v. Board of Education,137 dramatically and
fundamentally altered how the Supreme Court would treat
racially discriminatory practices, effectively putting to an end the
system of institutionalized apartheid that had existed in the
United States since the Court’s “separate but equal” Plessy
decision.138 The Court in Brown concluded that Plessy’s separatebut-equal doctrine allowing racial segregation in schools denied
equal educational opportunities to minority children and
accordingly found such practices unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Warren reasoned,
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.139

Appealing to notions of basic fairness (in terms resembling
those later expressed in John Rawls’s “original position of
equality” theory), the Court concluded that “these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”140
Of course, putting an end to deeply ingrained, centuriesold segregation practices would not simply be a matter of
See infra Section II.C.2.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state laws prohibiting interracial marriage).
138 Sheila Foster, Race, Agency, and Equal Protection: A Retrospective on the
Warren Court, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 77-78; see
also Scheiber, supra note 2, at 3 (stating, “[Brown] served to redefine dramatically the
constitutional imperatives of equal protection”). After Brown, the Court has expanded
the Equal Protection Clause’s reach beyond race to also include gender (Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976)); national origin (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944)); alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)); and
children of unmarried parents (Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-62 (1988)); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 713 (4th ed.
2011) (summarizing the Court’s equal protection doctrine).
139 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
140 Id.
136

137
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declaring such practices unconstitutional. A Court-ordered
remedy would also be necessary; accordingly, the Supreme Court
carried over to the next year, 1955, the question of what would
be the proper approach for effectuating the desegregation of
schools. In the follow-up case, Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II),141 the Court remanded the cases to the federal
district courts that had originally heard the cases, explaining
that “[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems[, but] courts
will have to consider whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles.”142 The Court looked squarely and
expressly to the judiciary’s power of equity:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the
exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the
personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest
may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles . . . . Courts of equity
may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of
such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner.143

Among the remarkable aspects of Brown was that it was a
unanimous decision. According to Justice William Douglas’s
memoirs, when the case had first been argued before the Supreme
Court only the previous year (then led by Chief Justice Fred
Vinson), it seemed likely that the Court would vote 5-4 to uphold
the separate-but-equal doctrine. Reaction to the Court’s decision—
especially the unanimity—was one of shocked surprise.144 For his
part, Warren credited the three Southern Justices. “Don’t thank
me,” he advised a friend, “I’m not the one. You should see what
those . . . fellows from the southern states had to take from their
constituencies. It was absolutely slaughter. They stood right up
and did it anyway because they thought it was right.”145
Brown was met with massive resistance. State officials
opposed desegregation in myriad ways. They claimed, for
example, that the Court’s mandate was simply not binding—that
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294.
Id. at 299.
143 Id. at 300 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
144 CRAY, supra note 1, at 287 (stating that, upon announcing the decision,
“Warren sensed more than heard a collective gasp from the people in the courtroom, ‘a
wave of emotion’ without sound or movement, ‘yet a distinct emotional manifestation
that defies description’”).
145 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 106.
141
142
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their legislatures could pass measures of “nullification” and
“interposition,” invalidating Court decisions they believed were
unconstitutional. The Court resoundingly rejected these
arguments in Cooper v. Aaron,146 just as it had done in a series of
cases in the pre-Civil War era a century earlier.147 Nonetheless,
true progress in desegregation did not occur for a full decade or
more after Brown—but in the end, the equal opportunity
mandate prevailed.148
2. Reapportionment Cases
All too often throughout the nation’s history, legislatures
have enacted voting regulations and restrictions that have
disproportionately affected and effectively disenfranchised poor
and vulnerable citizens, often from racial minority groups.149
These barriers on voting have only compounded the separate,
longstanding problem of rampant malapportionment and racial
gerrymandering, which have resulted in the underrepresentation
of racial minorities in both state legislatures and Congress.150
In the early 1960s, as it tackled malapportionment, the
Warren Court looked to the newly robust post-Brown Equal
Protection Clause. Until the Warren Court issued its landmark
Baker v. Carr151 and Reynolds v. Sims152 decisions in 1962 and
1964, for many decades, the Supreme Court stood mutely by on
malapportionment issues. Baker and Reynolds established the

146 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (unanimously repudiating the State
of Arkansas’s arguments in refusing to integrate Little Rock schools).
147 See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514, 525-26 (1859) (rejecting
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s attempt to repudiate the federal Fugitive Slave Act).
148 By 1964, only 1.2% of black children in the South were attending school with
whites. By contrast, by 1968 (as aided greatly by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both
authorized the U.S. Attorney General to intervene against laggard school districts and
tied receipt of federal education funds to compliance with the desegregation mandate),
32% of districts were desegregated (by 1973, 91% were desegregated). CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 138, at 741-42.
149 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 115, at 154-55 (“Malapportionment, as it
existed in many states, was severe, reinforcing racial inequalities as blacks moved to
cities, and . . . [was] completely lacking in a foreseeable political remedy. Such a system
was not only inconsistent with fundamental commitments to equality in voting, or to
the idea that there were some bases on which it was impermissible to deny a vote, but
with the character of the U.S. Constitution as a representative democracy.”).
150 Indeed, both of these problems have recently reemerged in the current Roberts
Court’s decisions in such cases as Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181
(2008) (upholding a state law requiring all voters to show a photo identification) and Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (effectively striking down section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 requiring certain jurisdictions to receive preclearance from the Justice
Department before changing voting laws or district boundaries).
151 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding redistricting cases justiciable).
152 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportionment).
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now-axiomatic “one person, one vote” principle153—that one
person’s vote in any election should be counted with the same
weight as any other person’s vote—as a core element of fair
elections in a democracy.
Baker involved a claim by Tennessee voters that a state
apportionment statute used an irrational, unreasonable formula
for assigning representatives to the state legislature, thus
violating plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and
due process rights. Not surprisingly, in the district court, the case
was found nonjusticiable and dismissed, since matters involving
apportionment had long been held by the Court to be nonjusticiable
political questions under the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause,
which expressly left such matters solely to Congress,154 even when
state apportionment schemes are blatantly discriminatory. In the
1946 case Colegrove v. Green, for example, Justice Felix
Frankfurter explained (in denying review of an Illinois
malapportionment where counties with populations of 1,000 and
100,000 would each be entitled to one representative), “If
Congress failed . . . , whereby standards of fairness are offended,
the remedy ultimately lies with the people.”155
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court some 16 years
later in Baker, by contrast, concluded that in determining
whether a state apportionment system violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (as opposed to the Article
IV Guaranty Clause), none of the traditionally recognized political
question factors—including “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment [to another political branch],”156 which had been the
justification in the Guaranty Clause cases—apply. “Judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed
and familiar,” the Court explained, “and it has been open to courts

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Guaranty Clause) (“The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”).
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, for the Court’s full elucidation of political question factors.
The first factor, at issue here, designates as nonjusticiable political questions those
matters where there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department.” Id.
155 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946); see also South v. Peters, 339 U.S.
276, 277 (1950) (similarly finding nonjusticiable a matter involving state electoral
apportionment).
156 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
153

154
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since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine”
whether a particular law violates the clause.157
The Baker majority’s sea change away from a long
history of judicial passivity on the apportionment issue was
met with powerful resistance by Justice Frankfurter.158
Frankfurter castigated the majority’s new position in a note to
Justice John Harlan after the conference discussion: “What
powerfully emerged for me this afternoon . . . is that men who
so readily impose their will on the nation and the fifty states by
exultingly overruling their most distinguished predecessors
behave like subservient children when lectured by a martinet
with a papa-knows-best-for-the-best complacency.”159 Regarding
the decision itself, Frankfurter warned that it would leave the
courts in a “mathematical quagmire,” with little legal basis on
which to proceed.160
Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims, with the
justiciability barrier having been removed by Baker, the Court
then considered and struck down an Alabama apportionment
system in which Alabama failed, over the course of many decades
of shifting populations, to redistrict as required by the state
constitution. This resulted in a gross malapportionment that
disadvantaged black voters. Chief Justice Warren explained:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the
heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.161

The Chief Justice further explained:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres . . . . It would appear
extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally permitted
to enact a law providing that certain of the State’s voters could vote two,
five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living
elsewhere could vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law
to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in
one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the
votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value,
could be constitutionally sustainable. Of course, the effect of state

Id. at 226.
Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 35.
159 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 424.
160 Id. at 424-25.
161 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (stating, “The conception of political equality from the Declaration
of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote”); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia districting system).
157
158
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legislative districting schemes which give the same number of
representatives to unequal numbers of constituents is identical.162

In short, the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees all voters equal participation in elections.163
The Reynolds opinion, which Justice William Brennan
later suggested was driven by Warren’s core sense of fairness,164
hit with breathtaking force.165 For traditionalists, “[t]he outcry
was immediate and pained.” The Court “‘finished its work of
completely devastating one of the most basic and one of the most
revered concepts of American constitutional government,
[federalism],’”166 claimed Missouri Democrat Richard Ichord. New
York Times columnist Arthur Krock lamented the decision as
misguided, an
expression of the philosophy that the Constitution implicitly
provides for the correction of any social or political condition that a
majority of the Court deems undesirable and endows the Court with
power to take the functions of another branch of Government when
that branch fails to act.167

Many others, however, believed the Court to be well
justified, urging critics to remember that the Court stepped in
to answer the apportionment question only after the states had
utterly failed to fairly consider the issue. It was left to the
Court, therefore, with its unique standing within the federalist
regime, to correct a deep injustice to core voting rights.168
Warren himself never doubted the propriety of the “one
person, one vote” mandate. “If Baker had been in existence 50
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562-63.
Id. at 567. Reynolds specified, moreover, that the one person, one vote principle
applies to both the lower and upper chambers in a bicameral state legislature. Id. at 575-76.
164 CRAY, supra note 1, at 435 (quoting Justice Brennan, “Possessed of an
equal right to vote, the least of us, [Warren] thought, would be armed with an effective
weapon needed to achieve a fair share of the benefits of our free society”).
165 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 47 (“[O]ne journalist at the time
likened being in the Court on the day Reynolds was announced to ‘being present at the
second American Constitutional Convention.’ Even liberals and academics, warm to the
Warren Court, he continued, were ‘stunned.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting LUCAS A.
POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 252 (2000))).
166 CRAY, supra note 1, at 435 (quoting Rep. Richard Ichord).
167 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 507 (quoting Arthur Krock); see also CRAY,
supra note 1, at 435 (quoting Senator Barry Goldwater, who made the Supreme Court
a political issue in his presidential campaign, “I would be very, very worried about who
is president the next four or eight years, thinking of only one thing—the makeup of the
Supreme Court” (quoting Sen. Barry Goldwater)).
168 Jackson, supra note 115, at 141 & n.11 (citing ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON,
THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 239-40 (1968) (stating the “Court’s
reapportionment cases [were] prompted by ‘necessity’”)); see also MARTIN M. SHAPIRO,
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 247 (1964) (stating, “[I]t should be
remembered . . . that the Court did not act in the apportionment area until long after
the states had shown themselves totally incapable of doing the job”).
162

163
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years ago, we would have saved ourselves acute racial troubles.
Many of our problems would have been solved a long time ago,”
he asserted, in terms John Rawls might have later used in his
own justice-as-fairness theory, “if everyone had the right to
vote, and his vote counted the same as everybody else’s. Most of
these problems could have been solved through the political
process rather than through the courts. But as it was, the
Court had to decide.”169 Indeed, Warren later said that he
considered the reapportionment cases to be “his Court’s single
most profound contribution to the law . . . because only with
equality in voting could the political system live up to the
nation’s ideal of democratic elections and lawmaking.”170
In sum, Baker and Reynolds were enormously
influential. As Justice William Douglas recalled in his
autobiography, 36 states had reformed their apportionment
schemes by 1970. When combined with the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the Court’s attention to reapportionment resulted in
changes to 90% of U.S. congressional districts and to virtually
all state legislative districts.171
D.

Constitutional Bases: Due Process

The Warren Court also embraced a more expansive
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
which states, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”172 Under the
Warren Court’s jurisprudence, the Due Process Clause would
now proscribe, via the incorporation doctrine, a much broader
range of state conduct vis-à-vis Bill of Rights protections, and
would begin offering heightened recognition to other
enumerated and unenumerated individual rights, as well.
1. Incorporation and the Bill of Rights
Another way the Warren Court greatly bolstered fairness
for all Americans was in recognizing that most of the separate
provisions in the Bill of Rights apply not only to the federal
government, but also to state (and local) governments. In so
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 508.
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 3.
171 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 47; see also CRAY, supra note 1, at 437
(“Reynolds, coupled with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, had redrawn the political
landscape. In Congress and state legislatures alike, long-tenured incumbents found
their safe rural districts redrawn to accommodate urban and suburban growth. Many
chose to announce their retirement.” (footnote omitted)).
172 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
169
170

2016]

JUSTICE-AS-FAIRNESS

705

doing, the Court showed sensitivity to, among other things, the
exceedingly vulnerable position of criminal defendants in the face
of a powerful prosecuting government.
Many are surprised to learn that the Bill of Rights—
roughly 28 protections contained in the first 10 amendments
that protect many of Americans’ most dearly held liberties and
rights against governmental infringement173—did not always
apply to the state governments. Specifically, by their terms, the
protections encompassed within the Bill of Rights apply only
against the federal government.174
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause (stating, “No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States”)175 was intended to correct this shortcoming by applying
those protections against state and local governments.176 The
Supreme Court, however, effectively read the Privileges or
Immunities Clause out of the Constitution in 1873 in the
Slaughter-House Cases,177 just five years after the Fourteenth
173 Id. amends. I-VIII. The 28 protections in the Bill of Rights are found within
the following amendments: U.S. CONST. amend. I (rights of freedom of expression and
freedom of press, of free exercise of religion, of assembly, of petition; right against
government establishment of religion); U.S. CONST. amend. II (right to keep and bear
arms); U.S. CONST. amend. III (rights against quartering soldiers in times of peace, and
in times of war); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, against warrants without probable cause); U.S. CONST. amend. V (rights of
criminal grand jury, of due process; rights against being twice charged for same crime,
against self-incrimination, against takings of property); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (rights
of speedy trial, of public trial, of impartial jury in district where crime occurred, of
being informed of crime, of confronting witness against, of calling witnesses in favor, of
assistance of counsel); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (rights of civil jury, of reexamination of
facts only under common law rule); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (rights against excessive
bail, against excessive fines, against cruel and unusual punishment).
174 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). The
amendments constituting the Bill of Rights were proposed in 1789 and ratified in 1791,
two years after the Constitution’s ratification. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 3, 8 (1998).
175 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
176 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (quoting Senator
Jacob Howard, chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, on May 24, 1866,
“[Section 1 is intended to impose a] general prohibition upon all the States, as such, from
abridging the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States. . . . To these
privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully
defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the personal
right guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution; such as
the freedom of speech . . . [and] the right to keep and to bear arms”). Similarly,
Representative John Bingham, Section 1’s sponsor in the House, repeatedly explained
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would encompass “‘the bill of rights’—a phrase
he used more than a dozen times in a key speech on February 28.” AMAR, supra note 174,
at 182. In response to John Bingham’s strong statements in the House, nobody spoke up
to disagree with him. Id. at 187 (stating further, “[s]urely, if the words of section I meant
something different, this was the time to stand up and say so”).
177 Butchers’ Benevolent Ass’n of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co. (Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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Amendment’s ratification.178 For many decades, therefore, states
were allowed to continue abridging certain individual rights that
would be protected but for the fact that it was a state, and not the
federal government, abridging the rights.
Gradually, the Supreme Court began considering whether
states might be depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property” in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.179
The first time the Court expressly applied a Bill of Rights
provision to the states through the Due Process Clause was in the
1925 case, Gitlow v. New York.180 There, the Court found that the
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press
were “fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’” that could not
be impaired by the actions of the states.181
The Supreme Court incorporated several more
constitutional provisions in the following decades.182 The Warren
Court began applying more provisions from the Bill of Rights to
the states through its “selective incorporation” doctrine, which
itself took a relatively more objective, searching look at the
history of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment than
that taken under the Court’s earlier approach. Selective
incorporation posed as the proper question for analysis whether a

178 For descriptions of how the Supreme Court arguably improperly found that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not apply the Bill of Rights to the states, see,
for example, Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO.
L. REV. 1, 27-35 (2007); Michael Anthony Lawrence, The Potentially Expansive Reach of
McDonald v. Chicago: Enabling the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2010 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 139, 141-49 (2010); see also Michael Anthony Lawrence, Rescuing the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause: How “Attrition of
Parliamentary Processes” Begat Accidental Ambiguity; How Ambiguity Begat
Slaughter-House, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 445, 447 (2009) (suggesting the
ambiguity regarding “U.S. citizenship” versus “state citizenship” in the first two
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, was the result of a circumstantial
accident during the congressional drafting process).
179 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 241 (1897) (regarding the Due Process Clause’s protection against state
infringement of property rights); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-101 (1908)
(regarding the Due Process Clause’s protection against state infringement of Bill of
Rights generally).
180 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
181 Id. at 666 (citation omitted).
182 Bill of Rights provisions incorporated before the 1953 beginning of the
Warren Court era include the First Amendment’s religion, press, and assembly clauses,
the Fourth Amendment’s unreasonable searches and seizures clause, and the Sixth
Amendment’s public trial and notice of accusation clauses. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religion); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press); DeJonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (search
and seizure); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial/notice of accusation).
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particular right “is fundamental—whether, that is, . . . [it] is
necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”183
It seems only fair and proper that such Bill of Rights
protections would apply to any form of government—it makes
little difference, after all, to a person whose speech has been
officially silenced, for example, whether the silencing was
performed by the federal or a state government. Either way,
the person is being prevented by government from speaking—a
seemingly clear violation of the First Amendment. Yet by the
time Earl Warren joined the Court in 1953, only a handful of
Bill of Rights provisions had been applied to the states.184 In
the 18-year span from when Earl Warren became Chief Justice
until two years after his 1969 retirement, by contrast, the
Court incorporated an additional dozen provisions (mostly
involving criminal procedure).185
The “‘Warren Court revolution’ gave new configuration to
the entire constitutional landscape,”186 fundamentally changing
the face of criminal justice in America. After these additional Bill
of Rights provisions had been incorporated, no longer could states
use evidence that had been seized by the police in the course of an
unreasonable search,187 for example, and police would now be
required to have a lawful warrant in order to search or seize
persons, places, or things (Fourth Amendment).188 In addition, no
longer could a state use a defendant’s refusal to testify as
evidence of guilt,189 nor could a state try a person more than once

183 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). On similar reasoning,
in a companion case to Brown, the Warren Court “reverse-incorporated,” through the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause (which applies textually only to state governments) so that the Equal
Protection Clause would apply also to the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
184 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
185 Most of the incorporation cases came following Felix Frankfurter’s 1962
retirement. See infra notes 187-197 and accompanying text. Thereafter, Warren,
Brennan, and the Court’s more liberal wing (Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, and Thurgood
Marshall) were able to consolidate their positions. Scheiber, supra note 2, at 10-12.
186 Schieber, supra note 2, at 11.
187 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961). Warren viewed Mapp’s
extension of the exclusionary rule to the states as “‘the only way . . . [to] control
governmental misadventure’ and to assure all persons, including the innocent, of
effective protection of their rights in criminal-justice processes in the states.” Scheiber,
supra note 2, at 13.
188 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Not all Warren Court decisions went against the states and police. See, e.g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding the “reasonableness” standard (versus probable
cause) for stop-and-frisk).
189 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda, which “was entirely
[Warren’s]” according to Justice Fortas, “was the ultimate embodiment of the Warren
fairness approach.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 589, 628.
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for the same offense (Fifth Amendment).190 A state would now be
required to provide a speedy trial191 (by jury192) to a criminal
defendant, who is entitled to receive the assistance of legal
counsel193 and the opportunity to compel the appearance of
favorable witnesses194 and to confront adverse witnesses (Sixth
Amendment).195 No longer could states impose excessive bail or
cruel and unusual punishments (Eighth Amendment),196 and
finally, the First Amendment right to petition for redress of
grievances was applied to the states.197
Of course, there were many critics of the Warren Court’s
assertive posture in incorporating virtually all of the Bill of
Rights’ criminal procedural requirements to apply against the
states. Many believed the Court’s actions would ultimately
contribute to a rise in crime, to which Warren later responded:
“Thinking persons and especially lawyers know that this is not
the fact. They know that crime is inseparably connected with
factors such as poverty, degradation, sordid social conditions,
and weakening of home ties, low standards of law enforcement
and the lack of education.”198
More fundamentally, conservative critics lamented the
progressive Warren Court’s “assault” on state sovereignty. The
Court was criticized for being too “judicial[ly] activ[e]”199—
turning the tables on the progressives’ and liberals’ criticisms
of the conservative Lochner-era Court a half century earlier for
its assertive posture in overturning hundreds of federal and
state laws in promotion of its vision of economic liberty.200
Professor Vicki Jackson suggested, however, that the
opinions reveal that the Court was not actually insensitive to the
states, but rather, was deeply troubled by local police actions that
failed to adhere to basic constitutional concepts of fairness and

190 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-94 (1969) (overruling Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 742.
191 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 218-19, 222-23, 226 (1967).
192 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
193 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963). “[F]ew people realize
that the Gideon decision resulted directly from Warren’s [initiative],” Schwartz
reported. “[T]he Chief ’ s new law clerks [in 1961] were instructed by one of the prior
term’s clerks, ‘Keep your eyes peeled for a right to counsel case. The Chief feels
strongly that the Constitution requires a lawyer.’” SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 457-58.
194 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
195 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
196 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
197 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
198 CRAY, supra note 1, at 462 (quoting Warren).
199 See generally PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
WARREN COURT (1970) (criticizing the Warren Court’s activist jurisprudence).
200 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 19.
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human dignity.201 Simply put, “[t]here is a less consistent sense
that [the Warren Court believed] all rights and remedies should
be nationalized than a sense that states were doing specific things
quite wrongly, that needed to be fixed.”202
Paradoxically, the Warren Court decisions supposedly
infringing on state sovereignty may have actually worked to
strengthen it. “[B]y providing the impetus for a more
democratically legitimate form of state government, [the
reapportionment decisions] helped contribute to a revival of states
as a locus of reform (and thence to the more aggressive judicially
enforced federalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries).”203 In short, the Warren Court’s efforts left federalism
healthier than before, affording many more people the
opportunity to participate in all aspects of the political process.204
2. Privacy
Beyond reading the Due Process Clause to apply most of
the Bill of Rights to the states, the Warren Court also began
interpreting the clause to encompass a broader range of
substantive rights. In 1968, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court
struck down a state statute punishing interracial marriage. “The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental
to our very existence and survival,”205 wrote Chief Justice Warren
for a unanimous Court. “To deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of
law.”206 Loving thus epitomizes the Warren Court’s expansive
201 Jackson, supra note 115, at 147-48 (further stating that the cases
“suggest[ ] that the Court’s purposes were not to displace state authority as such but to
establish a minimum judicially enforceable floor of federal standards”).
202 Id. at 141, 150 (stating, “It would be well to remember[, for example,] the
record of infringement of the Fourth Amendment that confronted the Court in Mapp
and its predecessors”).
203 Id. at 139.
204 Id. at 140.
205 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
206 Id. The Court also struck down the law on equal protection grounds:
“There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon
distinctions drawn according to race. . . . There can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 11-12.
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reading of social liberty—a reading that fits nicely into the
Rawlsian justice-as-fairness framework.
More controversially, the Warren Court found an implicit
“right of privacy” in the 1965 case, Griswold v. Connecticut.207 In
Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptives. Writing for
the Court, Justice Douglas explained that “specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy . . . [and] penumbral rights of
‘privacy and repose.’”208 In finding a privacy right in this case, the
Court wondered: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.”209
Griswold has been roundly criticized by (primarily)
conservative commentators, who argue that the Court should not
recognize a right of privacy since the Constitution does not
expressly recognize such a right. Justice Goldberg’s concurring
opinion (joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan)
thoroughly negates such objections, however, by highlighting the
Ninth Amendment’s dictate that, “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”210 Justices Goldberg,
Warren, and Brennan explained, “The Ninth Amendment to the
Constitution may be regarded by some as a recent discovery and
may be forgotten by others, but since 1791 it has been a basic part
of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold.” The right of
privacy in marriage is “basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted
in our society,” that for any person to suggest that it is not, just
because the Bill of Rights does not expressly state the same, “is to
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Id. at 484-85 (citations omitted). The Court identified a number of such
protections, such as the zone of privacy right of association (found in penumbra of First
Amendment), the zone of privacy not to have soldiers quartered in one’s home (Third
Amendment), the zone of privacy to be protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures (Fourth Amendment), and the zone of privacy not to be required to testify
against oneself (Fifth Amendment). Id. at 484.
209 Id. at 485-86 (stating this is “a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system”). Separate,
concurring opinions by Justices Harlan and White took a narrower approach,
suggesting that the privacy interest at issue was instead the sort of “liberty” protected
by the Due Process Clause because it “violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’” Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (further stating that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands . . . on its own bottom”).
210 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
207

208
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whatsoever.”211 The concurring Justices did not stop there,
however, instead going further to suggest that any judge failing to
recognize the right would run afoul of the Constitution:
Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not
protected . . . because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of
the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would
violate the Ninth Amendment, which specifically states that “[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”212

Regrettably, even half a century later, the Supreme
Court today fails to assertively enforce the understanding that
the Ninth Amendment creates an expansive definition of liberty
and equal justice—the sort of definition, incidentally, that would
comport well with John Rawls’s justice-as-fairness theory.213 The
Goldberg/Warren/Brennan Griswold concurrence remains the
Supreme Court’s most detailed acknowledgement of the Ninth
Amendment’s robust mandate.
That said, the various opinions in Griswold laid the
groundwork for the Court’s subsequent broader recognition of
the Due Process Clause’s role in protecting fundamental—and
other constitutionally protected—rights, such as a woman’s
right to choose abortion,214 the right to be free of unwanted
medical treatment,215 the right to engage in private sexual
activity of one’s choice,216 and most recently, the right of samesex couples to marry.217
E.

Constitutional Bases: First Amendment

Some suggest that the Warren Court was not as stalwart
on matters involving the First Amendment’s protection of speech,
association, and religion. First Amendment scholar William Van
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX)
(further explaining that the Ninth Amendment “is almost entirely the work of James
Madison. It was introduced in Congress by him and passed [easily by] the House and
Senate . . . . These statements of Madison and [Justice Joseph] Story make clear that
the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust
the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people”).
213 See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It
Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) (stating the Ninth Amendment’s requirement that “the
unenumerated (natural) rights that people possessed prior to the formation of
government, and which they retain afterwards, should be treated in the same manner
as those (natural) rights that were enumerated in the Bill of Rights”).
214 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
215 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
216 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
217 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
211

212
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Alstyne suggests that the Court took too long in asserting the
judiciary’s role in curbing congressional overreach (and
corresponding infringement of speech and association rights) in
matters involving the national interest, for example.218 Too often
in its early years, the Warren Court resorted to narrow
procedural or statutory interpretations to avoid reaching First
Amendment issues in cases involving communists and other
alleged subversives.219
In Walker v. Birmingham, for example, the Court affirmed
the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s and other civil rights
activists’ criminal contempt convictions for defying an Alabama
state court order not to march.220 Reasoning that “respect for
judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of
law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional
freedom,” the Court said the activists should have sought instead
to have the injunction set aside by a higher court.221
Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Fortas
dissented, with Warren asserting, “I do not believe that giving
this Court’s seal of approval to such a gross misuse of the judicial
process is likely to lead to greater respect for the law.”222 Warren
believed the law was unconstitutional on its face because it lacked
any sort of standards and worried that jailing Reverend King for
engaging in protected speech would cause people to lose faith in
the fairness of the judicial process.223
Despite its reticence on some First Amendment issues, the
Warren Court did eventually seriously consider matters of
fairness and equity in handing down a number of key First
Amendment opinions. Against the backdrop of McCarthy-era
witch hunts, for example, the Court decided a series of freedom of
association cases and reversed the convictions of (real or imagined)
communists and their sympathizers.224 Critics, including FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, began referring to the day when the
Court issued four of these cases, June 17,1957, as “Red
Monday.”225 In one of those cases, Yates v. United States,226 the
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 13-14 (paraphrasing William Van Alstyne).
Id.
220 Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
221 Id. at 307, 309, 311-12, 321.
222 Id. at 330 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
223 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 632-33.
224 “The law clerks starting kidding each other about the fact that we had the
Communists before us in at least a dozen or more cases and they were winning every
one,” recalled a Warren law clerk about the end of the 1956 Term. Id. at 280.
225 CRAY, supra note 1, at 332-38.
226 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The other three cases handed
down the same day were Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (reversing
conviction of a labor leader for declining to discuss his associations and beliefs and
218

219
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Court reversed the convictions of individuals who had been
charged, essentially because of their membership in the
Communist Party, with conspiracy to overthrow the U.S.
government by force. Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan
said the district court had not properly differentiated between
advocacy for an abstract idea and advocacy for action to bring
about the idea.227 “The essential distinction,” he said, “is that
those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do
something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in
something.”228 By drawing a hard line between advocacy
(protected) and action (not protected), the Supreme Court
precipitated the end of Congress’s McCarthy-era witch hunts.229
The landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan230
was a bulwark for freedom of speech and of the press.231 In
Sullivan, the Warren Court struck down an Alabama state court
award of $500,000 in damages to a plaintiff city commissioner
who claimed defamation due to certain trivial factual inaccuracies
in an advertisement placed in the New York Times by civil rights
activists.232 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan
explained that the Constitution prevents a public official from
recovering damages for defamation unless he or she “proves that
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.”233 The Court reasoned that “erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that
they ‘need . . . to survive.’”234 The Warren Court thus created a
framework for protecting the ability of anyone—individuals,
groups, and the press alike—to criticize the government or other
public figures without fear of legal repercussions.

placing limits on House Un-American Activities Committee), Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (holding state investigation into alleged subversive
activities violates Due Process Clause), and Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)
(finding invalid the discharge of diplomat who had been released for disloyalty in
violation of the State Department’s own procedures).
227 Yates, 354 U.S. at 320.
228 Id. at 324-25.
229 See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON
TO OBAMA: A STORY OF POOR CUSTODIANS 196-97 (2012).
230 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
231 Id. at 256.
232 Id. at 256-59, 264.
233 Id. at 279-80.
234 Id. at 271-73 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (further
stating, “Criticism of . . . [government officials’] official conduct does not lose its
constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes
their official reputations”).
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In the same vein, the Warren Court’s sympathetic position
regarding the antiwar protests of the 1960s largely mirrored the
views of the Chief Justice (who himself observed that “[t]his is a
country that was born in protest”), who suggested that the
protests “may prove effective in shaking the Establishment out of
complacency and smugness.”235 In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,236 for example, the Court
held that the act of students wearing black armbands to protest
the Vietnam War was the sort of expressive conduct—similar to
“pure speech”—protected by the First Amendment.237
Finally, the Warren Court established the highly speechprotective “clear and present danger” standard for incitement of
illegal activity, a standard that survives to this day. In
Brandenburg v. Ohio,238 the Court reversed the convictions of Ku
Klux Klan members who had burned a cross and chanted racist
threats and epithets at a meeting held on a farm outside
Cincinnati, reasoning that under the constitutional grants of
freedom of speech and of the press, a state cannot prevent
advocacy for the use of force unless that advocacy was used or was
likely to incite “imminent lawless action.”239 The Warren Court
thus “completed the Court’s long journey toward the embrace of
radical speech” and “declared that speech triumphed over fear.”240
On matters of First Amendment religious freedom, the
Warren Court was both bold and highly controversial. In a school
prayer case, Engel v. Vitale,241 for example, the Court found short
opening prayers in public schools to be unconstitutional
abridgements of the Establishment Clause. Writing for the Court,
Justice Black reasoned that

235 CRAY, supra note 1, at 487 (quoting Warren, who added, “[Protest is] a way
people have of bringing about progress”). Warren “seemed to understand the protest
movement,” recalled Warren’s law clerk, Paul Meyer. Id. Meyer added, “[f]or a man of
his age, my expectation would have been that Warren would be more narrow-minded
than he was, more fixed in a lot of positions than he was.” Id.
236 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
237 Id. at 505-06; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-77, 382
(1968) (determining that the conduct of burning a draft card in opposition to the Vietnam
War was sufficiently expressive in nature to merit a measure of protection under the First
Amendment and finding, on the facts, that the government met its burden, and thus
upholding O’Brien’s conviction for burning his draft card in violation of federal law).
238 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
239 Id. at 447-48 (explaining that “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action” (quoting Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961))).
240 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 504; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
241 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment
of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on
by government.242

Across the country, reaction to the holding was intense,
prompting the largest volume of critical mail to the Court in its
history. Warren himself recalled, “I vividly remember one bold
newspaper headline, ‘Court Outlaws God.’”243 Condemning the
Court, unhappy religious leaders communicated their “shock and
regret.”244 Indeed, the Warren Court’s position in Engle v. Vitale
even turned the popular minister Billy Graham off to the Court.245
Finally, in United States v. Seeger,246 a Vietnam War-era
case, the Warren Court broadly interpreted the First
Amendment’s protection of free exercise of religion to allow a
religiously agnostic person to claim statutory conscientious
objector status and thus avoid the military draft. The Court
explained, “[A]ny person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere
belief, which in his life fills the same place as a belief in God fills
in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption
under the statute.”247 Chief Justice Warren joined the majority,
commenting at conference, “Seeger believed ‘in a guiding spirit
and that’s enough to give [him] the exemption. I don’t know how
to define “Supreme Being” and judges perhaps ought not do so.’”248
This nonjudgmental cognizance of individual autonomy and
diversity of views—religious and nonreligious alike—epitomizes
the approach encouraged by John Rawls’s original position-ofequality formulation and sets a standard for judicial respect to
which all judges and courts should aspire.
The Warren Court’s fairness jurisprudence, grounded
primarily in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses, had a profoundly positive impact on
American life. The next part briefly discusses that legacy before
concluding that the Warren Court’s justice-as-fairness
jurisprudence, as augmented by John Rawls’s theory of justice,
would serve as a useful template for judicial decisionmaking in
the twenty-first century.

242
243
244
245
246
247
248

Id. at 425.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 441 (quoting Warren).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 192-93 (Douglas, J., concurring).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 570.
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THE WARREN COURT’S LEGACY: RAWLSIAN JUSTICE-ASFAIRNESS AS JUDICIAL GUIDING PRINCIPLE

The Warren Court’s legacy is imposing. Although the
Court was hugely controversial in its day, its “great moral
teaching,” Brown v. Board of Education, “remains the ideal; the
United States shall not be two societies, separate and unequal,”249
reflects Warren biographer Ed Cray. The benefits to redistricting
accomplished by the reapportionment cases persist, and despite
its widely contested beginnings, the concept of “one person, one
vote” has become firmly implanted in the public consciousness as
a core feature of basic fairness in the political system.250 In
criminal law, basic rights against self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure, as well as rights to legal
representation, were finally given full force—against state and
local governments as well as against the federal government—
during the Warren Court years.251
These axioms, in addition to the decisions that quelled the
McCarthy-era communist witch hunts and gave meaning to the
First Amendment’s separation of church and state by forbidding
prayer in public schools, have become integral threads in the
American legal fabric. The enduring breadth and scope of the
Warren Court’s decisions is striking.252 Indeed, with its embrace,
both expressly and implicitly, of basic concepts of human rights
and public virtue, the Court made impressive progress in
pursuing the ideals of fairness and equal justice.253 These Warren
Court concepts, as further informed by John Rawls’s “justice-asfairness” formulations, can provide useful tools for judicial
decisionmaking in the twenty-first century.
A.

Opposition and Support

The Warren Court was nothing if not polarizing. On one
hand, its supporters and adherents sang the Court’s praises for
addressing long-neglected principles of fairness and equal justice.
Meanwhile, its opponents were unrelenting in their criticism,
thinking the Court “too doctrinaire, too eager to right what it
takes to be wrong, too much concerned with grand abstractions of
liberty at the expense of the orderly growth and continuity of the

249
250
251
252
253

CRAY, supra note 1, at 530.
Id.
Id.
NEWTON, supra note 64, at 517.
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 21.
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law.”254 Whether “enlightened” or “unprincipled,” the Warren
Court engendered passionate opinions on both sides.
1. Opposition
Any account of the Warren Court would be incomplete
without mentioning the wrath it engendered among its critics.
The heavy criticism began in the Warren Court’s very first year
with its decision in Brown v. Board of Education and continued
with varying levels of intensity throughout the next 16 years.255
Professor Gary McDowell said, for example, “Since Brown, the
Court has continued to expand, and to confuse the public
perception of, its power of equity. The result has been to
substitute social-science speculation for precedent and principle
as the standard of both constitutional meaning and equitable
relief.”256 Brown was only the beginning, however.
As the Court in the mid-1950s began undoing the
McCarthy era’s damaging excesses by reversing trumped-up
convictions of communists and their alleged sympathizers
(culminating with Red Monday on June 17, 1957),257 opponents’
denunciations intensified. The widely circulated book, Nine Men
Against America: The Supreme Court and Its Assault on
American Liberties,258 for example, asserted that on Red
Monday, “[t]he Court really went to town—amid the cheers and
hurrahs of the communist conspirators.”259
CRAY, supra note 1, at 436 (quoting Newsweek).
Perhaps it was inevitable that the Warren Court triggered fierce opposition
for its progressive approach. Throughout the millennia, institutions and individuals
who have upset the well-settled, entrenched, too-often-unfair practices of the ruling
classes have encountered intense resistance. Witness, for example, the hardships
encountered by the brave individuals who have led the way throughout 400 years of
American history in agitating against the discriminatory and unfair practices of the
particular day’s status quo. See MICHAEL ANTHONY LAWRENCE, RADICALS IN THEIR
OWN TIME: FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND EQUAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (2011) (discussing the contributions of Roger Williams (d.1683), who
advocated for religious liberty of conscience; Thomas Paine (d.1809), who promoted
political and individual rights; Elizabeth Cady Stanton (d.1902), who agitated for
women’s rights; W.E.B. Du Bois (d.1963), who argued for black rights; and Vine
Deloria, Jr. (d.2005), who advocated for Native American rights).
256 MCDOWELL, supra note 116, at 9.
257 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text; CRAY, supra note 1, at 336-37.
258 ROSALIE M. GORDON, NINE MEN AGAINST AMERICA: THE SUPREME COURT
AND ITS ATTACK ON AMERICAN LIBERTIES (1958).
259 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 250 (quoting GORDON, supra note 258, at
128). Regarding Red Monday, the book asserted,
254

255

“Chief Justice Warren . . . took away from congressional investigating
committees their freedom of inquiry [in Watkins]”; in Sweezy “he nailed down
the clamp . . . on the rights of the states to protect their students against
subversive teachers”; and Yates “makes it practically impossible to prosecute
conspirators against America.”
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Fueled by Nine Men, the first efforts to impeach Earl
Warren began with the obscure Cinema Educational Guild in
September 1957, and continued with such groups as the John
Birch Society for the next decade or more.260 “Impeach Earl
Warren” signs were ubiquitous along the nation’s roads and
highways, and members of Congress received volumes of letters
favoring impeachment. Flyers urging impeachment were even
seen at Earl Warren High School in Downey, California, and
during these years, Warren was frequently accosted at public
functions by shouting protestors who would sometimes throw
their “Impeach Earl Warren” signs at him.261 The Georgia state
legislature got into the act, too, voting to impeach Warren and the
other Justices for committing “high crimes and misdemeanors.”262
It was not only anticommunists and segregationists who
were opposed to the progressive Warren Court; business groups
like the National Association of Manufacturers and the National
Chamber of Commerce were also critical of the Court’s perceived
“antibusiness” posture on antitrust and labor issues.263 Congress
debated the Jenner-Butler bill (thwarted eventually by efforts led
by Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson), which would have
removed the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in security cases.264
Even President Eisenhower, who had earlier opposed the school
desegregation decisions,265 jumped in, reportedly proclaiming that
his appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice “was the biggest
damn fool thing I ever did.”266
Id. (quoting GORDON, supra note 258, at 128-30).
260 CRAY, supra note 1, at 389-91; SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 250.
261 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 281-82, 627. For his part, Warren himself
maintained a sense of humor. “Just below his framed commission as Chief
Justice . . . on his library wall, there hung the 1965 New Yorker cartoon showing an
indignant caricature of Whistler’s Mother frantically embroidering a sampler, ‘IMPEACH
EARL WARREN,’” reports Schwartz. “According to one of his sons, ‘It really breaks him
up.’ Warren himself laughingly told a Southern law clerk that, if he was fired by the
Chief, he could go back home and run for Governor unopposed on both parties’ tickets.”
Id. at 281-82 (footnote omitted).
262 Id. at 250.
263 CRAY, supra note 1, at 322.
264 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 280; NEWTON, supra note 64, at 365-66.
265 CRAY, supra note 1, at 337. “Eisenhower . . . regarded racial segregation as
being so ingrained in social mores and long accepted in the law that the Court ought
not to ‘meddle’ with it.” Scheiber, supra note 2, at 5. Warren and the rest of the
Justices resented Eisenhower’s lack of support. William Douglas, for example, placed
blame for the South’s resistance to Brown squarely at the President’s feet, commenting
in his autobiography, “[Eisenhower’s] ominous silence on our 1954 decision gave
courage to the racists who decided to resist the decision ward by ward, precinct by
precinct, town by town, and county by county.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 175
(quoting William Douglas).
266 CRAY, supra note 1, at 337. Despite the President’s alleged disdain, during the
Red Monday furor he “called on the nation to respect the Supreme Court, which he termed
‘one of the great stabilizing influences of this country.’” SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 250.
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By the early 1960s, 32 state legislatures had approved
resolutions for a constitutional convention to discuss, among
other things, the Warren Court’s apportionment decisions.267
Erwin Griswold, Harvard Law School dean, weighed in,
stating, “The Supreme Court is as good a way as man has ever
invented to resolve judicial problems—but I very much doubt
that it’s a good way to resolve political problems.”268
In 1964, Republican presidential nominee Senator
Barry Goldwater accused the Warren Court of being the least
faithful among the three branches of government to the
principle of limited government and charged the Court with
jeopardizing social order “just to give criminals a sporting
chance to go free.”269 Stating that he would scrap the Court’s
criminal law decisions if elected, Goldwater further pledged to
nominate to the Supreme Court only “seasoned men who will
support the Constitution.”270
Specific criticism of the Warren Court’s approach to statefederal relations long abounded. In a 1958 report, the unofficial
Conference of State Chief Justices criticized the Warren Court for
systematically moving power to the federal government from the
states and for improperly making policy with its decisions.271 The
Warren Court’s incorporation decisions of the 1960s just added
fuel to the fire, to the point where there was a serious possibility
for passage of a proposal, supported by many state legislatures, to
gather the 50 state chief justices into a so-called Court of the
Union. This new Court would be tasked with the authority to
reverse Supreme Court decisions—a prospect that Earl Warren
found particularly threatening.272 As we shall see, however, many
did not share such negative opinions of the Warren Court.

267 CRAY, supra note 1, at 436. Thirty-four states would be the minimum
required to call a convention. U.S. CONST. art. V.
268 CRAY, supra note 1, at 436. The U.S. News & World Report observed
critically after Earl Warren’s 10-year Supreme Court anniversary that “the trend of the
Warren Court in using its judicial authority to promote change in more and more fields
shows no sign of abating.” Id. at 410 (quoting U.S. News & World Report). Congress
expressed its disapproval after the 1963 Term by limiting the Supreme Court Justices’
pay raise to $4,500 even while providing a full $7,500 for other federal judges.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 542.
269 SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 542 (quoting Sen. Goldwater).
270 Id. (quoting Sen. Goldwater).
271 CRAY, supra note 1, at 352. The vote count among the state supreme court
chief justices was 36-8 in favor of adopting the critical report. Id.
272 CRAY, supra note 1, at 391.
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2. Support
Even while the Warren Court endured much criticism, it
was also the object of copious high praise. Characterizing June
15, 1964, when the Court handed down Reynolds v. Sims
(mandating that all voting districts must be apportioned on the
basis of “one person, one vote”),273 as “one of the great days in
the Supreme Court’s history,” for example, the esteemed New
York Times reporter Anthony Lewis asked rhetorically, “Where
would we be today if the Supreme Court had not been willing
ten years ago to tackle the great moral issue of racial
discrimination that Congress had so long avoided?”274
For its part, around the same time, the Washington Post
editorialized, “[N]ot since the formative days of the Republic
when John Marshall presided over its deliberation has the
Supreme Court played so dynamic a part in American affairs
as during the dozen years since Earl Warren became Chief
Justice of the United States [Supreme Court].”275 Recalling the
period shortly after Warren’s retirement, journalist Jim
Newton stated, “[T]he early 1970s were full of reminders of
Warren’s esteem, as the Warren Court pivoted from its place as
object of controversy to one of lionization and nostalgia.”276 It is
no exaggeration to say that among its more ardent admirers,
the Warren Court was a savior of sorts for the Constitution’s
concept of equal justice under the law.
The Warren Court’s influence spread abroad, as well. In
other countries, among the most admired aspects of the Court’s
jurisprudence was its commitment to criminal defendants’ due
process rights.277 Reformers in Latin America, Canada, and
elsewhere looked to the Warren Court as an inspirational judicial
exemplar and agent for political and social change. In particular,
the Court promoted the notion that judges could take principled
stands against the executive and legislative branches of
government in furtherance of protecting the less advantaged.278
Earl Warren himself, as the face of the Supreme Court
that through a decade and a half of progressive jurisprudence
created a more fair, just, and humane America, received many
See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 507 (quoting Anthony Lewis).
275 CRAY, supra note 1, at 478.
276 NEWTON, supra note 64, at 510.
277 Scheiber, supra note 2, at 22-23 (stating that “[a] line of provisions in the
1987 Korean constitution and subsequent decisions of its constitutional court read like
a catalogue of the major reforms that the Warren Court imposed on America’s law of
criminal procedure”).
278 Id. at 22-24.
273
274
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personal plaudits as well. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported
in 1966, for example, that “[m]ore and more, Justice Warren is
being hailed as one of the great Chief Justices in history, a
towering figure ranking with John Marshall and Charles Evan
Hughes.” The New York Times Magazine labeled him “the
greatest Chief Justice in the nation’s history,” period.279
Internationally, from the time he delivered the Court’s
unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,
Warren was virtually lionized. “Within an hour of the [Brown]
decision, the Voice of America broadcast announced the opinion,”
wrote Cray. “Before nightfall, reports of Brown in thirty-four
languages proclaimed the ruling a victory in the diplomatic war
between East and West for the allegiance of unaligned nations.”280
The San Francisco Chronicle opined, “[t]o the vast majority of the
peoples of the world who have colored skins, it will come as a
blinding flash of light and hope.”281 “[Warren] has emerged,”
observed Washington Post columnist John P. Mackenzie, “as a
world figure and symbol of an American commitment to equal
justice to all races and income levels.”282 The Conferences on
World Peace Through the Law, upon awarding Warren its first
Human Rights Award in 1973, commented, “When history
reviews the record of our day in terms of man, leadership and
their accomplishment in advancing human rights, no name will
loom larger than that of Earl Warren.”283 Solicitor General J. Lee
Rankin recalled, “When you travel . . . , you realize [Warren] is
the best-known American in the world. The new nations of Asia
and Africa call him a saint—the greatest humanitarian in the
Western Hemisphere since Abraham Lincoln,” and jurists
worldwide prominently placed on their office walls photographs of
themselves with Chief Justice Warren.284
B.

Human Rights and Public Virtue

A palpable subtext running through the Warren Court’s
jurisprudence (also clearly apparent in John Rawls’s justice-as279 CRAY, supra note 1, at 478; see also NEWTON, supra note 64, at 510
(stating, “Warren himself was regularly included in any short list of great justices,
sometimes joined only by Marshall and Charles Evan Hughes when ranked against
history’s other chief justices”).
280 CRAY, supra note 1, at 292.
281 Id. (quoting the San Francisco Chronicle and further stating, “Brown
unexpectedly raised the man who made that possible into a world figure”).
282 Id. at 479.
283 Id. at 515. At the same conference two years earlier, Warren was
recognized “for his landmark decisions upholding human rights which have justly
earned him worldwide esteem as a champion of the liberty of man.” Id.
284 Id. at 293.
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fairness theory) was its recognition of basic human rights and its
acknowledgment of the importance of public virtue in civil society.
1. Human Rights
Concern for human rights and dignity had increased in
the years following the atrocities of World War II, and the Warren
Court reflected this heightened global awareness.285 The Court’s
incorporation cases286 “rais[ed] the floor of basic constitutional
norms designed to protect individuals from unfair treatment by
any government, state or federal [actor], . . . [and] can be seen as
harbingers of what has become a more generalized human rights
consciousness among jurists around the world.”287
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 was the first Warren
Court case to suggest that human dignity was a constitutional
principle, holding that official school segregation was
unconstitutional because it caused among blacks “a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”288 This
constitutional principle was then further emphasized in the civil
rights movement of the 1960s, when both the legislative and
executive branches extended their commitment to Brown’s
principles through the promotion and passage of legislation such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.289
As noted, Chief Justice Warren was willing to move the
Court in unprecedentedly assertive ways to impose upon the
states the human rights principles contained first in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (Brown)290 and
later the Bill of Rights (the incorporation cases).291 In principle,
Warren understood the Constitution’s commitment to a federalist
system where the national and state governments share power. He
did not, however, believe that federalism as a concept was so static
as to require the same sort of state-national balance that existed at
the time of the framing, the Reconstruction amendments, or any
Jackson, supra note 115, at 139.
See supra notes 173-204 and accompanying text.
287 Jackson, supra note 115, at 138-39. This consciousness is reflected “in
international documents and in the new constitutions adopted in other federal systems
such as Germany, India, and, later on, Canada.” Id. at 138 (footnotes omitted); see also
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 10-12 (discussing the Warren Court’s role in applying,
through the process of “incorporation,” many Bill of Rights provisions to the states).
288 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
289 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Dignity is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/dignity-is-aconstitutional-principle.html [http://perma.cc/LT9N-D3JF].
290 See supra notes 132-148 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 173-204 and accompanying text.
285

286
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other time in the past.292 Indeed, the Warren Court believed deeply
in the U.S. Constitution as an optimistic instrument for advancing
equal justice and recognizing human rights in the context of a
more modern, globally interconnected world.293
2. Public Virtue
Another characteristic of the Warren Court was its
implicit recognition of the importance of encouraging a sense of
“public virtue,” or common good, in society. This principle, time
honored from the nation’s founding, is epitomized by Earl
Warren’s 1953 comment as he moved from California governor
to the U.S. Supreme Court: “I am glad to be going to the
Supreme Court because now I can help the less fortunate, the
people in our society who suffer, the disadvantaged.”294
Time and again, the Court that bore Warren’s name
practiced this sort of principled, public-minded altruism,
employing principles that would later become associated with
John Rawls’s “justice-as-fairness” approach (based on providing
fairly for even the least-advantaged members of society). Rawls’s
“original position may derive from rules that stress rationality
and self-interest,”295 Professor Bruce Antkowiak explained, “but
the veil of ignorance changes societal decision-making from an
exercise in selfishness to one of public-mindedness . . . . When the
veil [is lifted], a sense of shared, common good emerges that
society affirms publicly. In affirming this common good, the
society becomes ‘well-ordered.’”296 This concept would be very
familiar to America’s founding generation, which had deeply held
ideas of public virtue—or “Public Spirit”—and what constituted
virtuous conduct. “Virtue was the common bond that tied together
the Greek, Roman, Christian, British, and European ideas of
government and politics to which the founders responded.”297
Scheiber, supra note 2, at 18.
Jackson, supra note 115, at 186-87 (stating, “Sensitivity to international
democratic norms was a marked feature in the Warren Court’s jurisprudence,” and
noting “[t]he Warren Court’s references to the Universal Declaration [of Human
Rights] and to other aspects of the nascent structure of international human rights”).
The modern Supreme Court, by contrast, has been much more insular. Id. (stating,
“[W]e see the emergence of an aggressive strand of hostility expressed, notably by
Justice Scalia, to the idea that U.S. constitutional decision making would benefit from
considering the legal views or experiences of other countries or international bodies”).
294 CRAY, supra note 1, at 255.
295 Antkowiak, supra note 43, at 601.
296 Id. (footnotes omitted).
297 Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, Public Virtue and the Roots of American
Government, 27 BYU STUD. 29, 29 (1987) (“The idea of virtue was central to the
political thought of the founders of the American republic. Every body of thought they
encountered, every intellectual tradition they consulted, every major theory of
292
293
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Leaders of the day understood virtue as the very foundation upon
which republican government is built and recognized it as a key
factor in advancing the common good.298
Thomas Paine, America’s revolutionary polemicist and
best-selling eighteenth-century author, insisted that acting in
the public good was not to act against the good of individuals.
Rather, by acting for the good of everyone, each individual was
served.299 Paine also commented:
When it shall be said in any country . . . my poor are happy; neither
ignorance nor distress is to be found among them; my jails are empty
of prisoners, my streets of beggars; the aged are not in want; the taxes
are not oppressive . . . ; when these things can be said, then may that
country boast its constitution and its government.300

Paine believed that virtuous nations have special responsibilities
for the well-being of the weak, poor, and vulnerable. He
advocated, therefore, for such policies as progressive taxation, aid
to the unemployed, and free public education.301
Throughout the following two centuries, as articulated by
many prominent progressive thinkers, the ideas of public virtue
and common good made a large sweep of the American social and
political landscapes. Though battered in the uber-capitalist frenzy
of recent decades, ideas extolling the common good do still exist
today. As one of the foremost moral authorities of recent times,
Pope John Paul II, put it, human beings should seek to pursue the
common good—“[the] good of all and of each individual, because
we are really responsible for all.”302 Not surprisingly, the ideas of
public virtue and common good go hand-in-hand with the Golden
Rule, an idea that has long been practiced in one form or another
by all of the world’s major religions.303
Earl Warren believed in these principles. A few years
after leaving the Court, he commented in a New York Times
opinion editorial that social welfare programs are “not an evil
word” when hunger affects millions of Americans.304 “When
republican government by which they were influenced emphasized the importance of
personal and public virtue.”).
298 Id. at 46.
299 1 Thomas Paine, Dissertations on Government, in THE POLITICAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE (London, R. Carlile, 1819).
300 THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 144-45 (London, Watts & Co. 1906).
301 ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 219 (1976); JACK
FRUCHTMAN, JR., THOMAS PAINE: APOSTLE OF FREEDOM 259 (1994).
302 Michael Gerson, Elevated by the Common Good, WASH. POST (May 7, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-elevated-by-the-common-good
/2013/05/07/b58f8dd2-b683-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_story.html [http://perma.cc/8XX3BD86] (quoting Pope John Paul II, who died in 2005).
303 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
304 CRAY, supra note 1, at 516 (quoting Warren).
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hundreds of millions of dollars are given to bankrupt railroads,
failing defense manufacturers, shipping interests and the like,
the words ‘welfare’ or ‘relief’ are not used,” he noted ironically.
“Instead such things are done to ‘strengthen the economy.’”305
Fortunately, traditional ideals of public virtue and concern
for the common good have not disappeared entirely from twentyfirst-century public discourse. As President Barack Obama stated
in his second inaugural address on January 20, 2013,
[P]reserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective
action . . . . For we, the people, understand that our country cannot
succeed when a shrinking few do very well and a growing many
barely make it . . . . We, the people, still believe that every citizen
deserves a basic measure of security and dignity.306

The president essentially invoked the veil-of-ignorance
paradigm in recognizing “that no matter how responsibly we live
our lives, any one of us at any time may face a job loss, or a
sudden illness, or a home swept away in a terrible storm.”
Obama insisted that “[t]he commitments we make to each other
through Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security, these
things do not sap our initiative, they strengthen us. They do not
make us a nation of takers; they free us to take the risks that
make this country great.”307
Responding to Obama’s Rawlsian remarks,308 conservativeleaning New York Times columnist David Brooks commented that
“[Obama’s] critique was implicit. There has been too much ‘me’—
too much individualism and narcissism, too much retreating into
the private sphere. There hasn’t been enough ‘us,’ not enough
communal action for the common good.”309 And Washington Post
columnist Michael Gerson suggested that “American politics
would be elevated by a renewed commitment to the common
good, . . . [making it] more civil, admirable and humane.”310 By
honoring basic concepts of human rights and public virtue, the

Id.
President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address by President Obama at the
United States Capitol (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama [http://perma.cc/V5WJ-8MVS].
307 Id.
308 Indeed, a review of Obama’s speech in The Economist is titled, “Obama’s
Rawlsian Vision.” Equality of Opportunity: Obama’s Rawlsian Vision, ECONOMIST (Feb.
19, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/02/equalityopportunity [http://perma.cc/X3KQ-LN95].
309 David Brooks, The Collective Turn, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/opinion/brooks-the-collective-turn.html?_r=0 [http://p
erma.cc/M3QJ-9LYL].
310 Gerson, supra note 302.
305
306
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Warren Court epitomized how a modern governmental institution
can advance the worthy ideals of fairness and equal justice.
CONCLUSION
It would be useful, in order to create a more fair, just, and
humane America, to look to Rawlsian justice-as-fairness theory
for guidance in judicial decisionmaking. In light of common law
imperatives of stare decisis, an acceptable way for judges to
proceed would be to adopt as a normative ideal the (essentially
Rawlsian) equity-based fairness jurisprudence approach employed
so effectively by the Warren Court in the years 1953–1969.
John Rawls reasoned that the justice-as-fairness
principles may serve, at the very least, “as a guiding framework,
which if jurists find it convincing, may orient their reflections,
complement their knowledge, and assist their judgment.”311 And it
is proper for judges to look to political philosophy for guidance.
Judges should not consider political philosophy as irrelevant,
since they often behave as de facto political philosophers when
interpreting the Constitution and imparting constitutional values.
“Avoiding political philosophy means doing bad philosophy, not
doing without it.”312 And among existing political philosophies
dealing with “justice” as a concept, Rawls’s theory is vastly
superior to any other.313
Justice-as-fairness decisionmaking, as based primarily in
the properly expansive Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, is neither inappropriate nor arbitrary. Indeed, its
approach of reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance is probably
more objective than many decisions claiming to be based on the
often uncertain or ambiguous “original intent” of long-deceased
ancestors. The noted historian Joseph Ellis reports that the
original intent doctrine “has always struck most historians of the
founding era as rather bizarre.”314 For, as historians, they
understand how much deep disagreement there was at the
Constitutional Convention and at the state ratifying conventions
about the Constitution’s basic provisions. Original intent doctrine
“requires you to believe that the ‘miracle at Philadelphia’ was a
uniquely omniscient occasion when 55 mere mortals were
permitted a glimpse of the eternal verities and then embalmed
Rawls, supra note 44, at 84.
Griffin, supra note 14, at 779.
313 Id. at 779-82.
314 Joseph J. Ellis, Immaculate Misconception and the Supreme Court, WASH.
POST (May 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/
02/AR2010050202446.html [http://perma.cc/C6R4-DRHE].
311
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their insights in the document. Any professional historian
proposing such an interpretation today would be laughed off the
stage.” Ellis concluded, “That four sitting justices on the Supreme
Court—Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts and
Samuel Alito—claim to believe in it, or some version of it, is truly
strange.”315 And yet original intent reasoning continues to
dominate constitutional discourse.
To illustrate how a judge might perform a Rawlsian
justice-as-fairness analysis, consider a court’s determination of
probable cause for issuing a warrant to search the home of a
person suspected of (and later charged with) committing a crime,
such as a home robbery. Such a determination involves the
interests of three parties—the defendant, the victim, and society.
From behind the veil of ignorance, the judge places herself in the
position of each of the three parties arguing separately for just
consideration. From the perspective of the defendant, the invasion
of privacy is at least upsetting—and even shocking if the
defendant is truly innocent. The victim, for her part, would want
the police not to be unnecessarily hampered as they search for
evidence of the robbery. Finally, society wants to know that the
neighborhood is safe from criminals but is also concerned about
overzealous policing leading to excessive intrusions on home
privacy. Proceeding in this way, the judge would then ask
whether “a rational, self-interested person adjudicating this case
[would] find the amount of evidence presented . . . sufficient to
justify . . . [the search] regardless of whether they would turn out
later to be the victim of the crime, the person searched, or the
neighbor down the street? If yes, probable cause exists.”316
It is important to note, however, that judges will differ
even when applying Rawlsian analysis. Judges are human beings,
after all. Even so, the justice-as-fairness approach does provide a
useful framework for courts seeking just outcomes.317 Ultimately,
justice is served through such a process, which bases the probable
cause determination on the balancing of personal and societal
interests in a way that seeks to maximize the common good. And
not insignificantly, judges may accordingly find that their
opinions “weather the test of time” by applying original position
analysis.318
Rawls believed that “[h]istorically one of the main defects
of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the
Id.
Antkowiak, supra note 43, at 598.
317 Id. at 599; see also, e.g., Griffin, supra note 14, at 716 (stating, “Rawls’s
theory remains the best and most relevant theory of justice available”).
318 Antkowiak, supra note 43, at 605-06.
315
316
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fair value of political liberty,”319 or the right to participate equally,
fully, and meaningfully in a democratic society. “Disparities in the
distribution of property and wealth that far exceed what is
compatible with political equality have generally been tolerated
by the legal system.”320 This is a major problem in America, where
today, income inequality is higher than at any time since the
early 1900s and where money plays such an outsized role in the
political process.321 As Justice Louis Brandeis once warned in the
decades following the last Gilded Age, “[w]e can have democracy
in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in the
hands of a few, but we can’t have both.”322
It should be emphasized that, according to Rawls, “full and
meaningful participation” does not require absolutely equal
participation. The second principle of justice permits inequalities
in economic goods, so it follows that not every person, in practical
terms, has the same opportunity to participate. Absolute equality
is not the goal; rather, the goal is to “take whatever steps we can
to ensure that everyone has a fair chance to hold public office, to
be informed about political issues, to place items on the public
agenda, and generally to influence the political process.”323
There is no doubt that Supreme Court decisions since the
Warren Court have failed to meet a standard of “taking whatever
steps we can to ensure that everyone has a fair chance” to
participate meaningfully in the political process. First, money in
politics is out of control. The wealthy enjoy a massively
disproportionate voice and role in the political process, as enabled
by the Court’s decidedly non-Rawlsian, overly broad, and
formalistic interpretations of the First Amendment’s protection of
free expression—first in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo,324 and most
319 Griffin, supra note 14, at 770 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971)).
320 Id.
321 The sheer scale of wealthy donors’ outsized contributions vis-à-vis those of
average citizens is illustrated by the following figures from the 2012 elections: “The top 32
Super PAC donors, giving an average of $9.9 million each, matched the $313.0 million
that President Obama and Mitt Romney raised from all of their small donors combined—
that’s at least 3.7 million people giving less than $200.” Furthermore, “[n]early 60% of
Super PAC funding came from just 159 donors contributing at least $1 million. More than
93% of the money Super PACs raised came in contributions of at least $10,000—from just
3,318 donors, or the equivalent of 0.0011% of the U.S. population,” and “[i]t would take
322,000 average-earning American families giving an equivalent share of their net worth
to match the Adelsons’ $91.8 million in Super PAC contributions.” BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM
LIOZ, BILLION DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2012
ELECTIONS (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/billion.pdf [http://
perma.cc/WT2X-ZXLC] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
322 Louis D. Brandeis Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
quotes/l/louisdbra140392.html [http://perma.cc/B9BR-EVPK] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
323 Griffin, supra note 14, at 770.
324 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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recently in 2010 in Citizens United v. FEC.325 Rawls, who
advocated for the independence of political parties from private
wealth, campaign and election public financing, caps on the
amount of contributions to political campaigns, and government
subsidies for full discussion of public issues, was highly critical of
Buckley for striking down campaign finance legislation.326
Second, for millions of citizens, the fair chance for
meaningful participation in the political process has been severely
compromised by the Roberts Court’s recent gutting of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 in Shelby County v. Holder,327 a case
demonstrating a disturbing lack of concern for the corollary to the
one person, one vote principle that states should make every
effort to enable and encourage all eligible voters to vote. In Shelby
County, the Court struck down the Act’s formula requiring states
and localities with a history of discrimination to receive
preapproval from the Justice Department before making changes
to their voting laws. (This despite the fact that the Act had been
renewed by Congress in 2006 by a vote of 390-33 in the House
and 98-0 in the Senate—rare agreement among Democrats and
Republicans in a highly partisan Congress.) In short, far from
seeking to enable and encourage all eligible voters to vote,
Shelby County instead made it much easier for jurisdictions that
have previously discriminated to discriminate once again—as
demonstrated by the changes made by a number of the previously
affected jurisdictions to re-impose discriminatory voting practices
shortly after the decision was announced.328
The decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Courts are placed in particularly harsh light when compared to
those of the Warren Court half a century ago.329 The Warren
325 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.
Ct. 1434 (2014). In these cases, the Court has favored the wealthy (who often have copious
funds to invest) by conferring enhanced “personhood” status on corporations and other
organizations, to which skeptics are said to wryly reply: “[A] corporation will never truly be
a citizen until you can execute one in Texas.” Timothy Egan, The Conscience of a
Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/opinion/
timothy-egan-the-conscience-of-a-corporation.html?emc=edit_th_20150404&nl=todayshead
lines&nlid=51212577 [http://perma.cc/9DL6-W8GD].
326 Griffin, supra note 14, at 770.
327 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
328 See, e.g., Kara Brandeisky et al., Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme
Court Ruled on Voting Rights Act, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2014, 12:31 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by-state-map [http://perma.cc/F52M-KSHZ]
(“Two months after . . . [Shelby County was handed down], North Carolina cut early voting
and eliminated same-day registration”; “[s]even [former] preclearance states have
announced new restrictions since [Shelby County]”; “Virginia has purged 38,000 voters, and
Kansas has suspended registration for 17,500.”).
329 New York University professor Burt Neuborne captures well the
frustration with the post-Warren Supreme Court in a letter to the New York Times:
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Court did in fact attempt to meet a standard of “taking whatever
steps we can to ensure that everyone has a fair chance” to
participate meaningfully in the political process.330 Dubbed the
“fair politics” institution by some,331 the Warren Court played a
vital role in guaranteeing the political liberty of all Americans
with its landmark “one person, one vote” reapportionment cases.
Indeed, “Chief Justice Warren claimed the reapportionment
decisions as his Court’s greatest accomplishment because more
than any other decisions . . . they attempted to create a fair society
in which everyone has an equal chance . . . . [P]olitics should
provide ‘fair and effective representation for all citizens.’”332
Were they to adopt a Rawlsian-based justice-as-fairness
approach to the campaign finance and voting rights cases, the
Justices in the majority in Citizens United and Shelby County
(Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony
Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas) would imagine
from behind the veil-of-ignorance that they might themselves be
members of an at-risk minority or other group whose votes are in
Fifty years of Supreme Court tinkering with our political system has resulted
in a democracy so dysfunctional that no rational person would choose it.
The people, through their elected representatives, gave us an effective Voting
Rights Act to protect minority voters. The Supreme Court told us that we don’t
need it anymore. The people gave us a campaign finance law limiting the
expansive political power of the rich. The Supreme Court told us that unlimited
campaign spending by the 1 percent doesn’t corrupt the democratic process.
The people gave us a practical way to allow underfunded candidates to
compete with rich ones. The Supreme Court told us that it was unfair to the
rich. The people walled off the vast trove of corporate wealth from our
elections. The Supreme Court told us that unlimited corporate electioneering
was good for us.
The people drew legislative lines to help racial minorities recover from
centuries of political exclusion. The Supreme Court told us that it was a
dangerous form of racism.
But when today’s politicians entrench themselves in power by putting
hurdles in the way of poor people voting, gerrymandering district lines to
assure the re-election of incumbents, and stacking the electoral deck in favor
of the majority party, the Supreme Court just stands by.
....
. . . Poor people have to jump through hoops to vote. The party in power
controls the outcome in too many legislative elections. And the superrich
have turned too many of our elected representatives into wholly owned
subsidiaries, and most of our elections into auctions. Madison would weep.
Burt Neuborne, Letter to the Editor: Invitation to a Dialogue: Democracy Gone Awry,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/opinion/invitation-to-adialogue-democracy-gone-awry.html [http://perma.cc/G7HP-KF3W].
330 Griffin, supra note 14, at 770.
331 Anderson & Cain, supra note 85, at 43.
332 Id.
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danger of being compromised by questionable districting practices
and overly onerous registration requirements. Or they might be
part of the vast majority of Americans who do not have great
wealth or power, but who nonetheless care deeply about the
issues confronting the nation. When such persons see hurdles
being erected that make it more difficult for the less advantaged
to vote and the massively outsized influence that those with great
wealth or power are able to exert (with no possibility that they
will ever be able to come close to having that sort of voice), they
justifiably believe that the system is rigged. Situated among the
at-risk individuals, each Justice, acting in his own self-interest,
presumably would opt for striking down impediments to voting
and upholding more stringent limits on campaign finance.
A justice-as-fairness approach would enable the judiciary
(not least the U.S. Supreme Court) to impartially address the
social and political realities of the twenty-first century—a
substantial improvement in administering justice for an
institution too-often tarnished by the taint of bias and privilege.
By combining elements of both the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence under Chief Justice Warren and the political
theorist John Rawls’s groundbreaking “justice as fairness” theory,
it is possible to devise an improved approach to judicial
decisionmaking that would better serve America’s core principles
of liberty and equal justice for all.

